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INTRODUCTION
The number of service animals utilized by persons with
disabilities in the United States appears to be growing.1 The role
these animals play in the lives of their human partners can go
beyond their utility to assist with a disability and it is a
relationship that people will fight to protect.2 This Article
considers the use of service animals by juveniles in a specific
environment—primary and secondary educational institutions.
In April 2010, the author presented an article on this topic at the
Mid-Atlantic Regional Animal Law Symposium.3 Since that time
there have been important legislative and case law developments
in this field.4 This Article focuses on those recent developments.5
1 Beth Teitell, Service Dogs Barred, Doubted and Deeply Treasured, BOS.
GLOBE (Sept. 18, 2013), https://www.bostonglobe.com/lifestyle/2013/09/18/thegrowing-number-dogs-assisting-people-with-invisible-conditions-causingconflict-and-some-cases-confrontation/igPnUBYHa97K07ccBGJJVJ/story.html
(discussing growing number of persons with non-apparent disabilities using
service animals).
2 See id. (reporting on confrontations some persons using service animals have
had in connection with utilizing their animals in public).
3 Rebecca J. Huss, Canines in the Classroom: Service Animals in Primary and
Secondary Educational Institutions, 4 J. ANIMAL L. & ETHICS 11, 11 n.1 (2011)
[hereinafter Huss, Classroom]. Around the time of the publication of that article
there was a “flurry” of other articles relating to the subject; however, the topic has
been covered less frequently in academic journals in recent years. See Jennifer
Berry & Antonis Katsiyannis, Service Animals for Students with Disabilities
Under IDEA and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 47 INTERVENTION
SCH. & CLINIC 312, 312 (2012); Susan G. Clark, The Use of Service Animals in
Public Schools: Legal and Policy Implications, 254 EDUC. L. REP. 1,1 (2010); Scott
B. Mac Lagan, Right of Access: How One Disability Law Disabled Another, 26
TOURO L. REV. 735, 735 (2010-2011); Danny Schoenbaechler, Autism, Schools, and
Service Animals: What Must and Should be Done, 39 J.L. & EDUC. 455, 456 (2010);
Joshua T. Walthall, The Dog Days in American Public Schools: Observations and
Suggestions Regarding the Laws, Challenges and Amazing Benefits of Allowing
Service Animals to Accompany Children with Special Needs to School, 35
CAMPBELL L. REV. 149, 151 (2012); Tara A. Waterlander, Canines in the
Classroom: When Schools Must Allow a Service Dog to Accompany a Child with
Autism into the Classroom Under Federal and State Laws, 22 GEO. MASON U. C.R.
L.J. 337, 337, 339 (2012); Sarah Allison L. Wieselthier, Grooming Dogs for the
Educational Setting: The “IDEIA” Behind Service Dogs in the Public Schools, 39
HOFSTRA L. REV. 757, 757–58 (2011); Perry A. Zierkel, Service Animals in Public
Schools, 257 EDUC. L. REP. 525, 525 (2010).
4 See infra notes 31–229 and accompanying text (discussing developments
since the author’s previous article analyzing this issue).
5 Readers interested in this area of the law are encouraged to read the author’s
previous work on the issue. See Huss, Classroom, supra note 3, available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1586029
and
at
http://works.bepress.com/rebecca_j_huss/8/. The previous article includes
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Because of the limited scope of this Article, it will not cover ethical
concerns regarding the use of service animals. However, the
author has written about that issue in the past and encourages
those involved in these relationships to always consider the needs
of the animal in the partnership, as well as needs of the human.6
After setting forth a basic overview of the issue, the Article
analyzes the amendments to the regulations of the Americans with
Disabilities Act (“ADA”) relating to service animals that became
effective in March 2011.7 The Article then considers recent case
law and other indications of how agencies of the federal
government interpret the issue.8 The Article continues by
examining state laws enacted to allow for a right for students with
disabilities to be accompanied by service animals in schools.9 The
Article concludes by providing guidance for student advocates and
school administrators dealing with this issue.10
There is no way to know how many service animals have been
partnered with juveniles in the United States; however, the
number appears to be increasing.11 Although it will not provide a
definitive answer, the United States Department of Education
background on students utilizing service animals, and the issue of allergies in
addition to analysis of older cases and state laws in existence at the time of the
writing of that article. Id. at 11.
6 See, e.g., Rebecca J. Huss, Why Context Matters: Defining Service Animals
Under Federal Law, 37 PEPP. L. REV. 1163, 1170–74 (2010) [hereinafter Huss,
Context] (discussing ethical issues regarding the use of service animals); Huss,
Classroom, supra note 3, at 18–19 (discussing ethical issues relating to the use of
service animals by juveniles); see also Temple Grandin et al., The Roles of Animals
for Individuals with Autism Spectrum Disorder, in HANDBOOK ON ANIMALASSISTED THERAPY, FOUNDATIONS AND GUIDELINES FOR ANIMAL-ASSISTED
INTERVENTIONS 225, 231–35 (Aubrey H. Fine ed., 2015) (discussing selection of
service animal and animal welfare issues); Phillip Tedeschi et al., On Call 24/7—
The Emerging Roles of Service and Support Animals, in HANDBOOK ON ANIMALASSISTED THERAPY, FOUNDATIONS AND GUIDELINES FOR ANIMAL-ASSISTED
INTERVENTIONS 321, 328–31 (Aubrey H. Fine ed., 2015) (discussing selection,
training, and animal welfare considerations).
7 See infra notes 25–30 and accompanying text.
8 See infra notes 31–254 and accompanying text.
9 See infra notes 256–300 and accompanying text.
10 See infra notes 301–07 and accompanying text.
11 Huss, Classroom, supra note 3, at 12–15 (discussing students’ utilization of
service animals); see also Christine T. Cossler, Dog and Pony Show: New
Guidance for Service Animals in the School Setting, 77 SCH. BUS. AFF. 23, 23
(2011) (stating that “schools may see a significant increase in the number of
service animals or service animal requests”); Ed Finkel, Who Let the Dogs In?:
Non-Visually Impaired Kids are Bringing Their Aide Dogs to Class, A.B.A. J., Apr.
2010, at 20 (quoting supervising attorney with the Ohio Legal Rights Service,
Kristin Hildebrant, that “[t]here has been sort of an upsurge in those cases . . .
[p]eople are getting service dogs at younger ages”).
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(“DOE”) has announced that it will be including questions in an
upcoming survey of special education teachers to report on whether
students with disabilities are using service animals.12 If future
surveys include similar questions, it will be possible to better
estimate the percentage of students utilizing service animals in
schools.13
In the context of the use of service animals in primary and
secondary educational institutions, two federal laws intersect in a
manner that can cause conflicts.14 The comprehensive federal civil
rights law prohibiting discrimination on the basis of disability
(regardless of age) is the ADA.15 Public entities and places of
accommodation must grant access and make reasonable
accommodations for individuals with disabilities under Title II and
Title III respectively.16
As discussed infra, a reasonable
accommodation may consist of allowing a service animal in a
setting that generally bars animals.17
The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (“IDEA”) is
another federal law that applies to students with disabilities.18
12 Dep’t of Educ., Appendix E: Fourth-Grade Special Education Teacher
Questionnaires,
REGULATIONS.GOV
(Sept.
25,
2014),
http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=ED-2014-ICCD-0103-0010.
This is a survey that is part of the Department of Education’s Early Childhood
Longitudinal Study, Kindergarten Class of 2010–11. Id. The question regarding
the use of service animals is included in Appendix E Fourth-Grade Special
Education Teacher Questionnaire. Id. It is important to note that, in theory, a
student utilizing a service animal may not be receiving special education services.
13 See Huss, Classroom, supra note 3 and accompanying text.
There is
currently no census or official national registration of service animals so estimates
vary widely regarding the number of service and assistance animals partnered
with persons with disabilities in the U.S. Huss, Context, supra note 6, at 1166–
67 (discussing the estimates of the number of service animals in the U.S.).
14 See generally LAURA ROTHSTEIN & JULIA IRZYK, DISABILITIES AND THE LAW §§
2:1–2:5 (4th ed. 2009). Along with many other topics, a general discussion of the
federal laws impacting special education is beyond the scope of this Article. Id.
15 See generally 42 U.S.C. § 12101, et seq. (2012) (as amended by the ADA
Amendments of 2008, Pub. L. 110-325 (S. 3406) (Sept. 25, 2008)).
16 See generally Title II, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131–12165 (2012) and Title III, 42
U.S.C. §§ 12181–12189 (2012). Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act provides
“[n]o otherwise qualified individual with a disability . . . shall, solely by reason of
his or her disability . . . be denied the benefits of . . . any program or activity
receiving Federal financial assistance . . . .” 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (2006). If
applicable, Section 504 is utilized along with the ADA in service animal cases.
17 See infra notes 25–30 and accompanying text (discussing the ADA
regulations).
18 See generally 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400–1482 (2006). The IDEA was amended in
2004 by the Individuals with Disabilities Educational Improvement Act, Pub. L.
No. 188-446, 118 Stat. 2647. See ROTHSTEIN & IRZYK, supra note 14, at §§ 2:3–2:5
(providing a brief history of the IDEA).
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Under the IDEA, states are required to have policies that provide
“[a] free appropriate public education” (“FAPE”) to all children
with disabilities.19 An individualized educational program (“IEP”)
is established for every student with a disability.20 The IDEA
requires extensive administrative procedures that must be
exhausted prior to a parent filing a lawsuit based on an argument
that a school district has not provided a FAPE or otherwise has
violated the IDEA.21
A third federal law—the Rehabilitation Act—specifically Section
504 of that statute (“Section 504” or the “Rehabilitation Act”)22
applies to state and local educational programs and provides that
“[n]o otherwise qualified individual with a disability . . . shall,
solely by reason of her or his disability . . . be denied the benefits
of . . . any program or activity receiving Federal financial
assistance.”23 Because Section 504 is often referenced secondarily
to the ADA and IDEA, it will not be discussed separately in this
Article.24
I. AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT REGULATIONS
New regulations governing the ADA, including a definition of
service animal, became effective in March 2011.25 Prior to that
time, the regulations under Title II of the ADA (applicable to state
and local entities) did not include specific language relating to
19 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(4) (2012). Free appropriate public education is defined
as: “special education and related services that . . . (B) meet the standards of the
State educational agency; (C) include an appropriate . . . education in the State
involved; and (D) are provided in conformity with the individualized education
program . . . .” 20 U.S.C. § 1401(9) (2012).
20 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(1)(A)(i) (2012).
21 See infra notes 33–164 and accompanying text (discussing the cases where
the exhaustion of administrative procedures requirement was argued).
22 29 U.S.C. § 794 (2012).
23 Local school districts are subject to the mandates of Section 504 because
entities that receive funds indirectly are covered under the Rehabilitation Act.
ROTHSTEIN & IRZYK, supra note 14, at § 2:2 (discussing the applicability of Section
504). All states receive federal funding for public educational programming. Id.
24 Frequently Asked Questions on Effective Communication for Students with
Hearing, Vision, or Speech Disabilities in Public Elementary and Secondary
Schools, U.S. DEP’T. OF JUSTICE, CIVIL RIGHTS DIV., at 4–5, (Nov. 2014),
http://www2.ed.gov/policy/speced/guid/idea/memosdcltrs/doe-doj-eff-commfaqs.pdf.
25 See 28 C.F.R. § 35.104 (2011) (effective March 2011, includes definition of
“service animal”); see also 28 C.F.R. § 35.104 (2010) (2010 version of the
regulation, without a definition of “service animal”); Huss, Context, supra note 6,
at 1174–79 (discussing the proposed ADA regulations).
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service animals, although Department of Justice (“DOJ”) policy
statements asserted that state and local entities would have the
legal obligation to allow for a service animal if it would be a
reasonable modification in the entity’s policies, practices, or
procedures.26 Under the new regulations “service animal” is
defined as: “any dog that is individually trained to do work or
perform tasks for the benefit of an individual with a disability,
including a physical, sensory, psychiatric, intellectual, or other
mental disability.”27 The regulations also require entities to make
reasonable accommodations to permit the use of a miniature horse
as a service animal using several assessment factors.28
Entities are not allowed to “ask about the nature or extent of a
person’s disability” but are permitted to “ask if the animal is
required because of a disability and what work or task the animal
has been trained to perform.”29 The regulations prohibit entities

26 Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Disability in State and Local Government
Services, 75 Fed. Reg. 56,164, 56,191 (Sept. 15, 2010) (to be codified at 28 C.F.R.
pt. 35).
27 28 C.F.R. § 35.104 (2014). The remainder of the definition is as follows:
Other species of animals, whether wild or domestic, trained or
untrained, are not service animals for the purposes of this definition.
The work or tasks performed by a service animal must be directly
related to the . . . [handler’s] disability. Examples of work or tasks
include, but are not limited to, assisting individuals who are blind or
have low vision with navigation and other tasks, alerting individuals
who are deaf or hard of hearing to the presence of people or sounds,
providing non-violent protection or rescue work, pulling a wheelchair,
assisting an individual during a seizure, alerting individuals to the
presence of allergens, retrieving items such as medicine or the
telephone, providing physical support and assistance with balance and
stability to individuals with mobility disabilities, and helping persons
with psychiatric and neurological disabilities by preventing or
interrupting impulsive or destructive behaviors. The crime deterrent
effects of an animal’s presence and the provision of emotional support,
well-being, comfort, or companionship do not constitute work or tasks
for the purposes of this definition.
Id.
This language is mirrored in regulations applicable to Title III of the ADA. 28
C.F.R. § 36.104 (2014).
28 28 C.F.R. § 35.136(i) (2014); 28 C.F.R. § 36.302(c)(9) (2014). There have been
no reported cases involving access for a miniature horse acting as a service animal
for a student in primary or secondary school. However, according to media
reports, a pre-school student has utilized a service horse at one school. See The
Associated Press, Miniature horse is a service animal for an Alaskan 4-year-old,
Oregonlive,
THE
OREGONIAN
(Mar.
22,
2013,
11:32
AM),
http://www.oregonlive.com/pacific-northwestnews/index.ssf/2013/03/post_116.html.
29 28 C.F.R. § 35.136(f) (2014); 28 C.F.R. § 36.302(c)(6) (2014).
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from requiring “documentation, such as proof that the animal has
been certified, trained, or licensed as a service animal.”30
II. CASE LAW AND FEDERAL AGENCY ACTIONS—COMMONALITY OF
ISSUES
In situations where there is not a specific state law allowing for
access of a service animal in a school, common themes often arise
in the disputes. This Part of the Article will focus on recent cases
that have conflicting analyses regarding the intersection of the
IDEA and ADA.31 As discussed below, even if the IDEA’s
exhaustion of administrative remedies requirement is not applied
to enable a school district to exclude a service animal from school
property, there still may be issues regarding allowing a student to
be accompanied by a service animal under the ADA.32
A. Fry v. Napoleon Community Schools33
In June 2015, the Sixth Circuit affirmed a district court decision
dismissing a case based on the fact that a student utilizing a
service animal failed to exhaust the IDEA’s administrative
remedies.34 This is a key case in this field because it is the first
appellate decision on the issue since the revised ADA regulations
became effective in 2011, and the result is contrary to other recent
cases and arguably federal agencies’ interpretation of the issue of
when a student must be allowed to be accompanied by his or her
service animal in school.35
In the Fry case, Ehlena Fry,36 who has cerebral palsy, began
28 C.F.R. § 35.136(f) (2014); 28 C.F.R. § 36.302(c)(6) (2014).
Two contrasting cases will be discussed in more detail with less coverage for
other recent cases. See infra notes 33–178 (discussing the Fry and Alboniga cases
in more detail).
32 See infra notes 91–106, 165–78 (discussing cases where exhaustion of
administrative remedies was not an issue but other issues under the ADA were
analyzed).
33 Fry v. Napoleon Cmty. Sch., 788 F.3d 622 (6th Cir. 2015).
34 Id. at 623, 631.
35 See infra notes 85–89, 135–50, 156–64, 203, 209, 232, 238 (discussing cases
where exhaustion of remedies was not a barrier and administrative decisions that
applied the ADA rather than deferring to the IDEA process). The plaintiffs in the
Fry case petition for an en banc rehearing of the case was denied in August 2015.
Fry v. Napoleon Cmty. Sch., No. 14-1137, 2015 BL 254405 (6th Cir. Aug. 5, 2015).
The plaintiffs in the Fry case filed a petition for writ of certiorari to the U.S.
Supreme Court in October 2015. Fry v. Napoleon Cmty. Sch. No 15-497.
36 The court documents generally refer to the student by the designation E.F.,
but media accounts identify her as Ehlena Fry. Leanne Smith, Lawsuit Claims
30
31
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training with a service dog (Wonder) in 2008.37 In October 2009,
her elementary school refused permission for Ehlena to be
accompanied by Wonder and this decision was confirmed in
January 2010.38 In April 2010, the school allowed a trial period
where Wonder accompanied Ehlena for the remainder of the school
year.39 At the end of the school year the school informed the Frys
that Ehlena would not be allowed to attend school the next year
with Wonder.40
The Frys subsequently home schooled Ehlena and filed a
complaint with the federal Department of Education’s Office for
Civil Rights (“DOE OCR”) based on violation of the ADA.41 In May
2012, the DOE OCR “found that the school’s refusal to permit
Wonder to attend [school with Ehlena] was a violation of the
ADA.”42 The school did not accept the conclusions of the DOE OCR
but agreed to permit Ehlena to attend school with Wonder in the
Fall of 2012.43 In the letter associated with the Resolution
Agreement entered into by the school district, the DOE OCR
focused on Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act and Title II of the
ADA stating:
As a general rule, a school district’s responsibilities to students with
disabilities in the elementary and secondary setting may be satisfied
through adherence to Section 504 FAPE procedures. However, there
are situations in which a student with a disability may allege
disability discrimination that is properly analyzed as a question of
alleged different treatment program exclusion, or failure to provide
equal opportunity on the basis of disability under the Section 504
implementing regulation . . . and the Title II implementing
regulation . . . and/or as a denial of a reasonable modification under

Napoleon Community Schools, Jackson County Intermediate School District
Discriminated Against Child and Her Service Dog, MLIVE (Dec. 18, 2012, 2:15
PM),
http://www.mlive.com/news/jackson/index.ssf/2012/12/lawsuit_claims_napoleon_
commun.html.
There is no disrespect intended by identifying the students by name in this Article
if he or she has already been identified in the media. It is done merely to simplify
the description of the facts of the cases.
37 Fry, 788 F.3d at 624.
38 Id.
39 Id.
40 Id.
41 Id.
The complaint was based under the ADA and Section 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act. Fry, 788 F.3d at 624.
42 Id.
43 Id.
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the Title II implementing regulation . . . . 44

In the letter associated with the Resolution Agreement, the DOE
OCR established that Ehlena had a disability, Wonder met the
definition of service animal, and the school district had sufficient
information to make that determination.45 Thus, the school district
should have modified its procedures to permit the service animal
to accompany Ehlena rather than placing restrictions on the dog’s
use, “in effect preventing the service animal from serving
[Ehlena].”46
The Frys enrolled Ehlena in school in another district and filed
suit in December 2012, based on the school’s refusal to
accommodate between the Fall of 2009 and Spring 2012, seeking
relief under Title II of the ADA and Section 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act.47
The district court granted the school district’s motion to dismiss
finding that:
although the Frys did not specifically allege any flaw in [Ehlena’s]
IEP, if she were permitted to attend school with Wonder, that
document would almost certainly have to be modified in order to
articulate the policies and practices that would apply to the dog . . .
[t]herefore, the Frys’ request for permission for [Ehlena] to attend
school with Wonder ‘would be best dealt with through the
administrative process,’ and exhaustion [of the IDEA administrative
remedies] was required.48

The Sixth Circuit reviewed the basis and justification for the
IDEA’s exhaustion requirement.49 The Fry court referenced the
language in the IDEA that precludes the possibility that a party
can evade the IDEA’s procedures “by bringing suit contesting
educational accommodations under other causes of action.”50
The Sixth Circuit stated that the IDEA exhaustion requirement
44 Letter Associated with Resolution Agreement between the Department of
Education, Office for Civil Rights and Jackson County (MI) Intermediate School
District, dated May 3, 2012, 59 IDELR 172 (2012) (begins on p. 982, at 986, 986–
987) [hereinafter Jackson County Letter].
45 Id. at 986–87.
46 Id. at 987.
47 Fry, 788 F.3d at 624. The district court declined supplemental jurisdiction
over state law claims based on the Michigan Persons with Disabilities Civil Rights
Act. Id.
48 Id. at 624–25 (citing E.F. ex rel. Fry v. Napoleon Cmty. Schs., 2014 WL
106624, at *5 (E.D. Mich. 2014)).
49 Id. at 625.
“The IDEA’s exhaustion requirement ensures that complex
factual disputes over the education of disabled children are resolved, or at least
analyzed, through specialized local administrative procedures.” Id.
50 Id. at 626.
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applied in this case because it found the suit “turns on the same
questions that would have determined the outcome of IDEA
procedures,” essentially saying that the Frys alleged that the
school’s decision regarding the service animal denied Ehlena a
FAPE.51 The Fry court found that “the Frys’ claim [was] not that
the school failed to accommodate [Ehlena]’s disability at all, but
that the accommodation provided was not sufficient.”52 The Sixth
Circuit considered the primary claims that not allowing Wonder at
the school inhibited the development of the bond between Wonder
and Ehlena and “perhaps, hurting her confidence and social
experience at school” fell under the scope of factors that the IDEA
procedures consider.53 The Fry court cited to the only other
appellate decision on this issue decided by the Second Circuit in
2008, that stated a “request for a service dog to be permitted to
escort a disabled student at school as an ‘independent life tool’ is
hence not entirely beyond the bounds of the IDEA’s educational
scheme.”54
The Fry court also found that the allegations that allowing
Wonder at the school would have provided specific psychological
and social assistance at school were also “crucially linked” to
Ehlena’s education.55 The Sixth Circuit pointed to the role the
IDEA procedures have in creating a record that would assist in any
dispute based on ADA claims.56 Although the Frys sought money
damages, which are not available under the IDEA, this would not
be sufficient to excuse the exhaustion requirement.57 In addition,
although there is a “futility” exception to the exhaustion
requirement, the court did not find it applicable.58 In rejecting
arguments made by the Frys that relied upon the analysis of a 1990
case,59 which did not require the exhaustion of remedies, the court
stated utilizing that case’s logic “would allow any ADA or
Fry, 788 F.3d at 627.
Id.
53 Id. at 628.
54 Id. (citing Cave v. E. Meadow Union Free Sch. Dist., 514 F.3d 240, 248 (2d
Cir. 2008)). The Cave case is fully discussed in the author’s previous article on
this topic. Huss, Classroom, supra note 3, at 28–35.
55 Fry, 788 F.3d at 629.
56 Id. at 629–30.
57 Id. at 630.
58 Id.; see also notes 151–54 and accompanying text (discussing another case
where the futility exception was discussed and rejected).
59 The case of Sullivan v. Vallejo City Unified Sch. Dist., 731 F. Supp. 947 (E.D.
Cal. 1990) is fully discussed in the author’s previous article on this topic. Huss,
Classroom, supra note 3, at 24–27.
51
52
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Rehabilitation Act lawsuit to avoid the IDEA exhaustion
requirement by not explicitly alleging a denial of a FAPE.”60 The
Sixth Circuit court rejected the approach that views a claim based
on the Rehabilitation Act (or presumably the ADA) as asking
questions distinct from those considered by the procedures of the
IDEA.61 Instead, the Sixth Circuit found that having the service
dog at school is “reasonably related” to Ehlena’s disability only
because the service dog “enhances [Ehlena]’s educational
opportunities.”62
Unlike the Second Circuit case decided prior to the effective date
of the ADA revised regulations that the Fry majority court relies
upon in its analysis, in the Fry case there was a dissenting opinion
that found that the district court’s dismissal was inappropriately
premature and would have allowed, at a minimum, for the case to
be remanded to the district court to permit the Frys to attempt to
show that the IDEA’s exhaustion requirement was inapplicable or
it would have been futile or inadequate.63
The dissenting opinion distinguished between the ADA or
Rehabilitation Act and the IDEA stating that:
The ADA and the Rehabilitation Act guard Ehlena’s civil rights,
ensuring that she, like her fellow citizens, has equal access to public
facilities and publicly-funded programs. By contrast, the IDEA
guarantees that her education will be appropriate for her individual
situation. . . . In short, the ADA’s focus is on ensuring access; the
IDEA’s focus is on providing individualized education.64

The dissent also articulated that the majority opinion did not
establish a useful test, only providing a “loose standard” and the
district court’s test was “impossibly broad.”65 The dissent also
pointed to the language of the IDEA that states, “[n]othing in this
chapter shall be construed to restrict or limit the rights,
procedures, and remedies available under the Constitution, the
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, title V of the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973, or other Federal laws protecting the
rights of children with disabilities . . . .”66
The dissent cited to a Ninth Circuit case holding “[n]on-IDEA
claims that do not seek relief available under the IDEA are not
60
61
62
63
64
65
66

Fry, 788 F.3d at 630–31.
Id. at 631.
Id.
Id. at 638.
Id. at 633 (emphasis in original).
Fry, 788 F.3d at 633–34.
Id. at 635 (citing to the IDEA, 20 U.S.C. § 1415(I)).
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subject to the exhaustion requirement, even if they allege injuries
that could conceivably have been redressed by the IDEA.”67 The
dissent stated that the same Ninth Circuit opinion identified the
Sixth Circuit as one of the “courts [that] have not articulated a
comprehensive standard for determining when exactly the
exhaustion requirement applies.”68 If the Ninth Circuit’s approach
to this issue was utilized, the dissent argued that the issue would
be whether the “request for the service dog under the
circumstances of this case [would be] ‘the functional equivalent of
an IDEA remedy.’”69
The dissent distinguished between technical educational
matters that would fall within the IDEA and the experts qualified
to make decisions regarding issues such as whether a child should
be “confined to a wheelchair or encouraged to use a walker assisted
in balance and navigation by a service dog.”70 The dissent then
reviewed the results of the complaint to the DOE OCR that
articulated the various tasks Wonder performs with Ehlena.71 The
dissent pointed out, given that the school district refused to accept
the findings of the DOE OCR report, “[i]t is difficult to fathom what
could have been gained by requiring the Frys to undergo additional
‘exhaustion’ before filing suit.”72
As discussed below, recent decisions in other circuits’ district
courts have been mixed in determining whether it is necessary to
exhaust administrative remedies prior to bringing a suit based on
violation of the ADA.73 This illustrates the real challenge for
student advocates and school districts in determining the standard
that will be applied in these cases.74

67 Id. at 635 (emphasis added) (citing Payne v. Peninsula Sch. Dist., 653 F.3d.
863, 871 (9th Cir. 2011) (en banc), overruled on other grounds by Albino v. Baca,
747 F.3d 1162 (9th Cir. 2014)).
68 Fry, 788 F.3d 622 at 635 (citing Payne, 653 F.3d at 874).
69 Id. at 635–36.
70 Id. (emphasis in original). Presumably the emphasis was due to the fact
that this was the type of task Wonder performs with Ehlena.
71 Id. at 637. The dissent pointed out that the existing school district policy
allowed for a guide dog but not a service dog—described as a “stupefying fact.” Id.
72 Fry, 788 F.3d at 637. The dissent also articulated that this is a possible
rationale for arguing that exhaustion would be futile. Id. at 637–38.
73 See infra notes 75–164 and accompanying cases.
74 See infra notes 85–87, 142–44, 147–49 and accompanying cases (discussing
cases where the exhaustion of remedies argument failed).
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B. Alboniga v. School Board of Broward County Florida75
The February 2015, Alboniga case in Florida is another recent
example of how courts may interpret the request for a juvenile to
be accompanied by a service animal in school.76 In addition to the
“usual” analysis relating to the intersection of the ADA and IDEA,
this case provides the opportunity to consider other issues relating
to the ADA’s service animal regulations.77
Anthony Merchante78 was a six-year-old child with multiple
disabilities including cerebral palsy and a seizure disorder.79
Anthony’s mother (Alboniga) determined that Anthony required a
seizure alert and response dog.80 Stevie, the service dog that was
obtained, was trained to do multiple tasks relating to Anthony’s
seizures including alerting others if Anthony was undergoing a
medical crisis.81 Alboniga filed declarations, not controverted by
the School Board of Broward County (“School Board”), that
Anthony and Stevie formed a “service dog team” and separation of
the team could result in detrimental effects to the team.82 The
School Board’s response to Alboniga’s petition that Stevie be
allowed to accompany Anthony to the school was to request
additional vaccinations and liability insurance in addition to
requiring Alboniga provide an adult handler for Stevie.83 Initially
issues of jurisdiction were considered by the court.84

75 Alboniga v. Sch. Bd. of Broward Cnty. Fla., 87 F. Supp. 3d 1319 (S.D. Fla.
2015).
76 See id. at 1331–32.
77 See infra notes 107–31 (discussing validity of service animal regulations and
the issue of breed-discriminatory legislation).
78 Anthony Merchante was identified as A.M. in court documents, however,
his full name was disclosed in media reports about the case. Carol Marbin, In
Fight Over Boy’s Service Dog, Broward School Board is Brought to Heel, MIAMI
HERALD (Feb. 2, 2015),
http://www.miamiherald.com/news/local/community/broward/article10782953.ht
ml.
79 Alboniga, 87 F. Supp. 3d at 1323.
80 Id. at 1323–24.
81 Id.
82 Id.
83 Id. at.1324–25. Anthony’s mother acted as handler for Stevie from August
2013 to November 2013 and after that time the School Board provided a handler
for Stevie. Id. Stevie’s handler also acts as school custodian. Alboniga, 87 F.
Supp. 3d at 1325.
84 Id. at 1327.
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1. Jurisdiction: Failure to Exhaust Administrative Remedies
and Mootness Claims
Like other cases in this area of law, the School Board argued
that because Alboniga failed to exhaust the administrative
remedies under the IDEA, the court lacked subject matter
jurisdiction in the case.85 The Alboniga court cited to case law
supportive of the argument that the claims in this case were not
related to the child’s educational experience (either that the child
was being denied a FAPE or the IEP was deficient).86 Because the
district court found that the IDEA’s administrative scheme was not
implicated by the claims, it was not necessary to exhaust those
procedures prior to bringing this cause of action.87
The School Board also argued that the case was moot because
Anthony was allowed to attend school with Stevie.88 However,
because the decision to allow Stevie in the school was an
administrative decision that was actually in conflict with the
School Board’s own policies, the Alboniga court rejected the
mootness argument.89 The Alboniga court then analyzed issues
arising under the ADA regulations.90
2. Failure to Accommodate and Reasonableness of the
Requested Accommodation
The Alboniga court reiterated that the failure to accommodate
claim was an independent basis for establishing discrimination
under the ADA and focused on whether the accommodation was
reasonable.91 The Alboniga court held that the School Board’s
requirement for liability insurance and additional vaccinations for
Stevie in excess of the requirements under state law were a
surcharge prohibited by the ADA regulations.92 The court stated
Id.
Id. at 1329.
87 Id. at 1329–30.
88 Id. at 1330.
89 Alboniga, 87 F. Supp. 3d at 1331. The School Board’s policy provided that
“[i]n the case of a young child or a student with a disability who is unable to care
for and supervise his/her service animal, a handler provided by the parent is
responsible for providing care and supervision of the animal.” Id. The conflict
was that after November 2013, the school provided a handler for Stevie. Id. at
1325.
90 See id. at 1332, 1333.
91 Id. at 1337.
92 Id. at 1339 (citing to 28 C.F.R. § 35.136(h) (2011)).
85
86
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the analysis to determine whether an accommodation is reasonable
“must focus . . . on whether the requested accommodation is
reasonable under the specific circumstances particular to the
individual in question[ ]”93 and that the separation of Anthony from
Stevie during the school day would diminish Stevie’s effectiveness
outside of the school setting.94
The Alboniga court then turned to the specific regulatory
provision that “[a] service animal shall be under the control of its
handler.”95 The School Board argued that it would not be a
reasonable accommodation to require it to act as a handler for and
control Stevie and thus Alboniga must act as or provide a handler.96
The court recognized there was little case law interpreting what
constituted being a handler with control over a service animal.97
The Alboniga court considered the language in the regulations
requiring a service animal be leashed, tethered, or otherwise under
the handler’s control such as through voice commands or signals.98
Using this analysis, the court found that “normally, tethering a
service animal to the wheelchair of a disabled person constitutes
‘control’ over the animal by the disabled person, acting as the
animal’s ‘handler.’”99 With the exception of when Stevie needs to
urinate (and Stevie physically indicates when he needs to do so),
Stevie is tethered to Anthony’s wheelchair and the district court
found this would constitute Anthony acting as Stevie’s handler.100
Alboniga, 87 F. Supp. 3d at 1341.
Id. The Alboniga court cited to a statement in the Congressional Record for
the legislative history of the ADA: “‘[a] person with a disability and his . . .
[service] animal function as a unit’[ such that] . . . separating the two generally
‘[is] discriminatory under the [ADA].’” Id. at 1335.
95 Id. at 1341 (citing to 28 C.F.R. § 35.136(d) (2011)).
96 Id. at 1342.
97 Id. The court cited to a case that implies that the “opposite of a service
animal being under ‘control’ of a ‘handler’ is [the animal] being unattended.”
Alboniga, 87 F. Supp. 3d at 1342 (citing Shields v. Walt Disney Parks & Resorts
US, Inc., 279 F.R.D. 529, 547 (C.D. Cal. 2011)). The extent to which a school
district must assist a student in managing a service animal is a significant issue,
and it is likely this case will be referred to in these disputes. See, e.g., Wendy
Owen, Sherwood School District Thwarts Family’s Attempt to get Autism Service
Dog in Class with Son, THE OREGONIAN/OREGON LIVE (Mar. 11, 2015, 11:10AM),
http://www.oregonlive.com/sherwood/index.ssf/2015/03/sherwood_school_district
_thwar.html (discussing Sherwood Oregon School District’s position that the
parents provide a handler for a child’s service dog and referencing this case). The
parents of the student in Sherwood, Oregon filed a complaint with the
Department of Justice in December 2014. Id.
98 Alboniga, 87 F. Supp. 3d at 1342 (citing to 28 C.F.R. § 35.136(d) (2011)).
99 Id.
100 Id.
93
94
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The School Board argued that its responsibility for leading
Stevie outside to urinate would constitute care and supervision of
a service animal—activities not required of public entities under
the ADA regulations.101 The Alboniga court’s interpretation of
“care and supervision” would consist of “routine animal care—such
as feeding, watering, walking or washing the animal.”102 The
Alboniga court found that requiring a school employee to assist
Anthony in using his service animal is analogous to helping
students with other activities such as the use of an insulin pump
or motorized wheelchair.103 Because the School Board is being
asked to accommodate Anthony, not to care for Stevie, the
Alboniga court found the requested accommodation (not to provide
a separate handler), reasonable.104
Thus, the School Board was required to accommodate Anthony
by assisting Anthony in taking Stevie outside to urinate and would
not be allowed to require Alboniga to maintain additional liability
insurance or obtain additional vaccinations for Stevie in excess of
those required by state law.105
The Alboniga case also discussed of the validity of the ADA’s
service animal regulations, and provides the opportunity to discuss
the issue of the ADA regulations preempting local breeddiscriminatory legislation.106
3. Validity of Service Animal Regulations
One argument that the School Board made in Alboniga that was
unique, compared to other cases in the field, was that the DOJ
exceeded its statutory authority in promulgating the service
animal provision.107 It claimed the service animal regulations were
“inconsistent with, and impermissibly stricter than, the regulatory
provision requiring that public entities make reasonable
modifications to avoid discrimination on the basis of disability[.]”108
Id.
Id. at 1343. The Alboniga court also looked to Florida state law and the
guidelines of the Florida Department of Education to establish that care and
supervision “equates to the general upkeep and routine animal maintenance—
such as feeding, curbing, training or healthcare.” Id.
103 Alboniga, 87 F. Supp. 3d at 1344.
104 Id.
105 Id. at 1344–45.
106 See infra notes 123–31 and accompanying text.
107 Id. at 1333.
108 Alboniga, 87 F. Supp. 3d at 1333; see Statement of Interest of the U. S. of
Am., at 1, Alboniga v. Sch. Bd. of Broward Cty., Fla., (Case No. 0:14-CV-60085101
102
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The DOJ responded to these contentions by filing a Statement
of Interest.109 The Statement of Interest provided the regulatory
background for the ADA regulations.110 The DOJ cited to the
regulations that “generally permit individuals with disabilities to
use their service animals.”111 The DOJ then argued that it provided
a comprehensive view of “how public entities should address the
myriad issues that may arise in the service animal context[ ]”112
because of the inclusion of the specific exceptions to the general
rule allowing individuals with service animals to have access.113
The DOJ argued that its interpretation of the ADA should be
entitled to judicial deference and the agency’s regulations should
be “given controlling weight unless they are arbitrary, capricious,
or manifestly contrary to the statute.”114
The DOJ referenced the legislative history of the ADA in its
argument “that Congress specifically intended that individuals
with disabilities not be separated from their service animals,
including in schools.”115 The DOJ reiterated that “the ADA is
designed to respect the choices of individuals with disabilities and
ensure their ability to live independently.”116 The DOJ asserted
that “it is not for the School Board to survey the universe of
possible accommodations or modifications [to] determine for
BB) (Jan. 26, 2015) [hereinafter Alboniga Statement of Interest].
109 Alboniga Statement of Interest, supra note 108, at 3. The DOJ argued that
its interests were “particularly strong here, where the School Board has called
into question the Department’s authority to promulgate the Title II regulation.”
Id. “Because the Department authored the regulation and has an interest in
ensuring the ADA’s consistent interpretation and application[ ] the United States
respectively requests that the Court consider the views expressed herein in
resolving the School Board’s Motion for Summary Judgment.” Id. at 12.
110 Id. at 3.
111 Id. at 3 (citing to 28 C.F.R. § 35.136(a) (2011)), In addition, the DOJ cited
to other subsections of the regulations relating to permissible inquiries and
generally prohibiting requiring an individual using a service animal from paying
a surcharge. Id. See 28 C.F.R. § 35.136(f) & (g) (2011).
112 Alboniga Statement of Interest, supra note 108, at 4.
113 Id. at 4 (citing to 28 C.F.R. §§ 35.104 (2010), 35.130(b)(7) (2010), 35.136(b)
(2011), and 35.139 (2010)) (providing for access only if a dog that is individually
trained, allowing for a service animal to be excluded of the animal is out of control,
not housebroken, poses a direct threat to the health or safety of others, or if
allowing the service animal would fundamentally alter the nature of the entity’s
activities).
114 Id. at 5–6 (citing Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467
U.S. 837, 843–44 (1984)). The DOJ asserted that there was no language in the
ADA that explicitly addresses the use of service animals and because Congress
had not directly spoken to the issue this deference was appropriate. Id. at 5.
115 Id. at 7.
116 Id. at 8.
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[Anthony] the best, or most “reasonable” (from its perspective)
approach.”117 The DOJ rejected the School Board’s argument that
the ADA’s service animal regulation imposes an absolute mandate
and instead asserted that the provision is “a specific application of
the regulation’s reasonable modifications requirement[.]”118 The
DOJ also argued that its view had been long held and had
extensive judicial support over the years.119
The Alboniga court agreed with the DOJ’s analysis finding that
the “DOJ’s Title II regulations regarding service animals are
clearly a permissible interpretation of the ADA.”120 The Alboniga
court also stated the service animal regulations were “consistent
with and a specific application of the reasonable modification
regulatory requirement.”121 Utilizing this analysis the court
determined that the DOJ’s service animal regulations
implementing Title II were “valid, internally consistent, and
therefore enforceable against the School Board” in this situation.122
4. Breed-Discriminatory Legislation
Although not raised as an issue in Alboniga, it is important to
note that the service dog in this case was reportedly a Staffordshire
terrier.123 Although Broward County does not have a breeddiscriminatory ordinance (legislation that restricts or bans
ownership of certain breeds of dogs),124 the county located
immediately to the south (Miami-Dade) is one of the counties in
Florida that continues to impose a ban on pit-bull-terrier-like dogs,
including American Staffordshire Terriers.125 Although nineteen
117 Alboniga Statement of Interest, supra note 108, at 8. The DOJ also cited to
regulations that prohibit public entities from requiring individuals with
disabilities “to accept an accommodation . . . which [an] individual chooses not to
accept.” Id. (quoting 28 C.F.R. §§ 35.130(d), (e)(1) (2010)).
118 Id. at 10.
119 Id. at 9 (citing to several cases relating to service animal access).
120 Alboniga v. Sch. Bd. of Broward Cnty. Fla., 87 F. Supp. 3d 1319, 1334 (S.D.
Fla. 2015).
121 Id. at 1333.
122 Id. at 1337.
123 Marbin, supra note 78 (publishing a photo of Anthony Merchante with his
service dog Stevie and describing the dog as a Staffordshire terrier).
124 See Ch. 4, Animals, BROWARD COUNTY, FLA., CODE OF ORDINANCES,
https://www.municode.com/library/fl/broward_county/codes/code_of_ordinances?
nodeId=PTIICOOR_CH4AN (last updated June 16, 2015) (showing an absence of
breed-discrimination ordinance).
125 Pit
Bull
Law,
MIAMI-DADE
COUNTY
ANIMAL
SERVICES,
http://www.miamidade.gov/animals/pitbull-law.asp (last updated July 28, 2015).
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states restrict or prohibit local jurisdictions from enacting breeddiscriminatory legislation, due to grandfathering of existing
ordinances and the application of concepts such as home rule, there
are still many local jurisdictions with this type of ordinance.126 A
full discussion of the intersection of the ADA and breeddiscriminatory legislation is beyond the scope of this Article.127
However, it is important to note that there is regulatory guidance
by the DOJ and case law that state the regulations of the ADA
would preempt a local ordinance that would restrict or ban a pitbull-terrier-like dog being utilized as a service animal, solely based
on the dog’s appearance or breed.128 ADA regulations provide that
if a service dog is out of control (regardless of the breed), the
individual with the disability can be asked to remove the service
animal from the premises.129
It must be an individual
determination based on the behavior of the specific animal.130 Due
to the DOJ’s guidance and existing case law, it should be clear to
school boards that making an argument that a service animal
should not be permitted to accompany a child to school because of
the dog’s appearance or breed (rather than the dog’s behavior), is
going to be unsuccessful.131
C. Other Recent Cases: Exhaustion of Administrative
Remedies and Fundamental Alternation of Program
Arguments
This Part of the Article discusses other recent cases that
illustrate the complicated issues that arise in these situations.
126 Rebecca J. Huss, A Conundrum for Animal Activists: Can or Should the
Current Legal Classification of Certain Animals Be Utilized to Improve the Lives
of All Animals, MICH. ST. L. REV. (forthcoming 2016) (at nn.54 ̶ 56 and
accompanying
text)
[hereinafter
Huss,
Conundrum],
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2583208 (discussing the
intersection of federal disability laws and breed discriminatory legislation).
127 See generally id. at 2 (discussing this issue in depth).
128 Id. at nn. 57–59 and accompanying text (analyzing the guidance and case
law relating to the intersection of the ADA and breed discriminatory legislation).
129 28 C.F.R. § 35.136(b) (2010); 28 C.F.R. § 36.302(c)(2) (2011). The animal’s
handler should be asked to take effective action to control the dog. See 28 C.F.R.
§ 35.136(b) (2010); 28 C.F.R. § 36.302(c)(2) (2011).
130 Huss, Conundrum, supra note 126, at 22 n.85 (discussing the DOJ’s
guidance on the ADA service animal regulations).
131 U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Civil Rights Div., Frequently Asked Questions About
Service
Animals
and
the
ADA,
ADA
(July
20,
2015),
http://www.ada.gov/regs2010/service_animal_qa.html (discussing among other
issues, that service animals may be any breed of dog).
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1. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies: Bardelli v. Allied
Services Institute of Rehabilitative Medicine,132 M.T. v.
Evansville Vanderburgh Sch. Corp.,133 and A.S. v. Catawba
County Board of Education134
In the Bardelli case, a student at a private school (division of a
Pennsylvania not for profit health care and human services
provider) was initially not allowed to be accompanied by her
service dog at school.135 The student (M.B.), who has severe,
uncontrolled epilepsy, a learning disability, and is developmentally
delayed, attended a different school with her previous service
dog.136 After M.B. and Buddy (her new service dog) completed their
training, the dePaul School (“dePaul”)137 refused to allow Buddy at
the school based on a variety of reasons, including arguments that
the school could accommodate M.B. without Buddy, Buddy would
be a distraction, and another student at the school had dog
allergies.138 After over a year of discussions, Buddy was allowed to
accompany M.B. to dePaul if Buddy would wear a T-shirt.139 The
Bardellis alleged that the t-shirt hindered Buddy’s ability to
function as a service dog.140 The Bardellis withdrew M.B. from
dePaul after the parents were not notified that she had suffered
another seizure, and subsequently brought multiple claims against
the school.141
The school brought a motion to dismiss based on the argument
that the Bardellis failed to exhaust their administrative remedies
132 Bardelli v. Allied Serv. Inst. of Rehab. Med., No. CIV.A. 3:14-0691, 2015 WL
999115 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 6, 2015).
133 M.T. v. Evansville Vanderburgh Sch. Corp., 2013 WL 5918804, at *2 (S.D.
Ind. 2013).
134 A.S. ex rel. Leonel S. v. Catawba Cnty. Bd. of Educ., No. 5:11CV27-RLV,
2011 WL 3438881 (W.D.N.C. Aug. 5, 2011).
135 Bardelli, 2015 WL 999115, at *1.
136 Id.
137 Although the named defendant was Allied Services Institute of
Rehabilitative Medicine, for purposes of simplicity, the defendant will be referred
to as dePaul.
138 Bardelli, 2015 WL 999115 at *1. The Bardellis provided documentation
from M.B.’s physician explaining why it was medically necessary for Buddy to
accompany M.B. to school. Id.; see infra notes 291–92 and accompanying text
(discussing the DOJ’s position relating to possible conflicts with persons with
allergies).
139 Bardelli, 2015 WL 999115 at *2.
140 Id. The school allegedly did not propose an alternative accommodation. Id.
141 Id. In addition to the ADA and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act claims
that are the focus of this Article, the Bardellis also brought state law claims for
breach of contract, negligence and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Id.
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under the IDEA.142 Unlike many of the other cases that consider
this issue, the focus in this case was on dePaul’s status as a private
entity.143 The Bardellis successfully argued because dePaul is a
private school, and because private entities are not subject to
liability under or bound to the IDEA, that the Bardellis would not
be subject to the IDEA’s exhaustion requirement.144 As of the
summer of 2015, this case was ongoing.145
In the M.T. v. Evansville Vanderburgh School Corporation
(“EVSC”) case, two high school students alleged that the EVSC
service animal policy placed special burdens on students with
service animals in contravention of the ADA.146 EVSC argued that
the students’ claims should be dismissed because the students had
not exhausted their administrative remedies under the IDEA.147
The court’s discussion in this case was related to the general
concept that a failure to exhaust administrative remedies under
the IDEA would be an affirmative defense.148 Because generally,
the earliest time to consider an affirmative defense is after the
answer is filed, the court found that EVSC’s motion to dismiss was
premature and rejected it.149
Although the published opinion relating to the EVSC case only
related to the exhaustion of administrative remedies argument,
this case is also important because it illustrates the issues a school
142 Id. at *4. dePaul also argued that the state law claims should be dismissed
based on a failure to state cognizable claims. Id. The court did not dismiss the
state law claims and exercised supplemental jurisdiction over those claims. Id.
at *7.
143 Id. at *5.
144 Bardelli, 2015 WL 999115 at *4, *5. As previously discussed, the IDEA
requires states receiving funding from the federal government for education to
provide a free appropriate public education. See supra notes 20–21 and
accompanying text. Thus, the argument discussed in the Bardelli case is that the
IDEA obligates the state not the private school to fulfill this requirement.
Bardelli, 2015 WL 999115 at *4, *5. The public agencies retain responsibility
under the IDEA even if a private entity is utilized to comply with the IDEA. Id.
145 Bardelli et al v. Allied Serv. Inst. of Rehab. Med., No. 3:14-cv-00691 (M.D.
Pa. Apr. 9, 2014) (Bloomberg Law).
146 M.T. v. Evansville Vanderburgh Sch. Corp., 2013 WL 5918804, at *1, *2
(S.D. Ind. 2013). The students each had physical disabilities and there was no
controversy over the students’ use of the service animals—only on the
documentation and other requirements EVSC placed on the students prior to
their use of the dogs at school. Id.
147 Id. at *2.
148 Id. at *2.
149 Id. at *2–3. The court did not find the exception to this issue—when “the
failure to exhaust, is so plain from the face of the complaint that the suit can be
regarded as frivolous[ ]” was applicable. Evansville, 2013 WL 5918804 at *2
(citing Turley v. Gaetz, 625 F.3d. 1005, 1013 (7th Cir. 2010)).
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district may encounter if it has a service animal policy that is
considered to be one that burdens the students with disabilities.
The policy at issue required a student to provide certain
documentation to the school at least ten business days prior to
bringing a service animal to school.150
In the A.S. v. Catawba County Board of Education (“CCBE”)
case, the CCBE was successful in arguing that a case involving a
four year old (Ayden Silva) with multiple disabilities151 should be
dismissed based on a lack of subject matter jurisdiction due to a
failure to exhaust administrative remedies under the IDEA.152 The
CCBE court was not persuaded by the argument that an exception
to this exhaustion requirement (“that undertaking the
administrative procedures necessary to accomplish exhaustion
would work a severe harm on Plaintiff, or would be futile[ ]”)153
would apply.154 Although the DOJ filed a Statement of Interest in
this case, the court found that the Statement of Interest addressed
the merits of the cause of action (whether the student is entitled
access) and not whether exhaustion is futile.155
Although the CCBE case was dismissed by the U.S. District
Court in 2011, the Silvas subsequently filed a complaint with the
DOE OCR. The Resolution Letter and Resolution Agreement
issued by the DOE OCR relating to that complaint focused on the
rights of individuals under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act
and the ADA.156 The Resolution Letter stated that the CCBE’s
150 Evansville, 2013 WL 5918804 at *1. Note the ADA regulations do not
require any certification or other documentation. See supra note 30 and
accompanying text.
151 In addition to other developmental disabilities, Ayden is diagnosed with
static encephalopathy. A.S. ex rel. Leonel S. v. Catawba Cnty. Bd. of Educ., No.
5:11CV27-RLV, 2011 WL 3438881, at *1, *2, *7–8 (W.D.N.C. Aug. 5, 2011).
Although Ayden’s name was not disclosed in court documents, media reports
provided the information. Jeremy Detter, Therapeutic Dog to be Allowed in
Catawba County School, HICKORY DAILY RECORD (Mar. 21, 2013, 4:10PM),
http://www.hickoryrecord.com/news/therapeutic-dog-to-be-allowed-in-catawbacounty-school/article_5fa47ed0-9263-11e2-809a-001a4bcf6878.html.
152 Catawba, 2011 WL 3438881 at *2, *8.
153 Id. at *4 (emphasis in original).
154 Id.
155 Id. at *7.
156 Letter from United States Dep’t of Educ., Office for Civil Rights, to Holly
Stiles, OCR Complaint NO. 11-12-1553, (Mar. 8, 2013), at 3,
http://disabilityrightsnc.org/sites/default/files/OCR%20ltr%20re%20Catawba%2
0service%20animal%203-8-13.pdf [hereinafter CCBE Resolution Letter];
Resolution
Agreement,
OCR
Complaint
NO.
11-12-1553,
at
2,
http://www.disabilityrightsnc.org/sites/default/files/OCR%20agrt%20with%20Ca
tawba%20re%20service%20animal.pdf (last visited Aug. 22, 2015) [hereinafter
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policy on its face was generally consistent with Title II of the ADA;
however, the application of the policy in this instance that resulted
in the exclusion of the student’s service animal raised concerns
over compliance.157 The CCBE policy allowed for a service animal
to be excluded if “the presence of the animal fundamentally alters
the service, program or activity of the school system.”158 The
principal of the school told the DOE OCR that his understanding
of when this would occur is “if the presence of the animal is in
conflict with the educational program or the specific goals of the
[student’s] IEP.”159
The DOE OCR found that the decision makers for the CCBE in
this situation “were unable to articulate how the Student’s IEP
goals conflicted with the presence of the service animal, in large
part because they lacked a basic understanding of how the
Student’s service animal performs its functions.”160 In this
situation, the DOE OCR found that there was not a conflict
between the student’s use of a service animal and the IEP.161 The
DOE OCR Resolution Letter also analyzed the role of the service
animal and found that the dog’s presence would further the
student’s independence—a goal set forth in the IEP.162
The DOE OCR Resolution letter found that CCBE “failed to meet
its heavy burden of proving that the Student’s service animal
would fundamentally alter his educational program.”163 The
accompanying Resolution Agreement provided that the CCBE
would revise its Service Animals in Schools policy, provide training

CCBE Resolution Agreement].
157 CCBE Resolution Letter, supra note 156, at 4.
158 Id.
159 Id.
160 Id. (emphasis in original).
161 Id.
The DOE OCR also stated that it “need not address what rare
circumstances, if any, the use of a service animal could conflict with a student’s
IEP or 504 Plan and could, therefore, constitute a fundamental alteration. In
promulgating the amended Title II regulation, the Department of Justice
intended the ‘fundamental alteration’ exception to be narrow.” CCBE Resolution
Letter, supra note 156, at 4.
162 CCBE Resolution Letter, supra note 156, at 5. The DOE OCR used the
status of the fundamental alteration as a legal standard to justify its own review
of the student’s IEP though “[n]ormally, the OCR does not second-guess
educational decisions made through the FAPE process.” Id.
163 Id. at 6. The DOE OCR found that CCBE’s “explanation [for excluding the
service dog] is of particular concern because service animals generally function to
increase a person with a disability’s independence by assisting with functions that
the person, or student, cannot or in some cases may never be able to perform
without assistance.” Id.
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on the revised policy, and provide written notification that the
student would be permitted to bring the service animal to school.164
2. ADA Interpretation—Service Animal and Fundamental
Alteration of Program: C.C. v. Cypress School District165
In the C.C. v. Cypress School District case, the Central District
Court of California granted a preliminary injunction motion
requesting that the Cypress School District (“Cypress”) be required
to accommodate Caleb Ciriacks’ use of a service dog in school.166
Caleb was diagnosed with autism and was paired with his service
dog Eddy in May 2010.167 The Cypress court’s findings of fact
described the extensive training Eddy went through and the tasks
that Eddy performs with Caleb.168 The Cypress court found that a
preliminary injunction was warranted, focusing on two issues in
connection with a possible violation of Title II of the ADA: “(1)
whether Eddy is a service dog; and (2) whether [the Cypress’]
educational program would be fundamentally altered if Eddy
accompanied [Caleb] to school.”169
The Cypress court cited to the then newly effective ADA service
animal regulations to find that Eddy was a service dog under the
ADA.170 The Cypress court also found that the school district failed
to meet the burden of showing that allowing Caleb to bring his
service dog to school would fundamentally alter the school district’s

164 CCBE Resolution Agreement, supra note 156. There were other reporting
requirements. Another required revision to the service animal policy was to
remove any language stating that service animals were required to wear
identification in order to provide notice of the animal’s status. Id. at 2.
165 C.C. v. Cypress Sch. Dist., No. 11-352, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 88287 (C.D.
Cal. 2011).
166 Id. at 2. Caleb’s and his service dog Eddy’s names were disclosed in media
reports about the case. Fred Mamoun & Vicki Vargas, Family of Autistic Boy
Rejoices After Judge Rules Service Dog Must be Allowed at School, NBC 4
SOUTHERN
CALIFORNIA
(Jun.
16,
2011),
http://www.nbclosangeles.com/news/local/Judge-Rules-Service-Dog124028879.html.
167 Cypress, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 88287 at *2–3.
168 Id.
169 Id. at *2, *9.
170 Id. at *10–11 (citing 28 C.F.R. §35.104 (2011)). The school district argued
that “Eddy [was] primarily present to comfort [Caleb] and this comforting
presence is not enough to make him a ‘service dog’ under the ADA.” Id. at *10.
The Cypress court cited to Eddy’s specialized training and other tasks that Eddy
performs including preventing Caleb from elopement to support its finding that
Eddy was a service dog. Id. at *11.
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educational program.171 The Cypress court found the school
district’s evidence “scant” that the educational program would be
impacted—consisting of arguments that a staff member would
need to learn five-to-ten commands, hold the leash when
navigating campus, and tether and untether Eddy occasionally
during the day.172
Although the Cypress court acknowledged that the school
district’s strongest argument could be the possible impact Eddy
may have on other children at the school, it stated that the school
district raised “largely unsupported concerns about canine
aggression” and having “to teach the remaining students to ignore
the dog,” which were insufficient in this situation to show a
fundamental change to the educational program.173 The Cypress
court also found the school district’s argument “that allowing
[Caleb] to bring Eddy to school ‘would impede [Caleb’s] educational
process and independence. . . .’” largely irrelevant.174 The Cypress
court distinguished between whether Eddy would fundamentally
alter the educational program versus whether it would improve
Caleb’s educational progress.175
In order to grant the preliminary injunction the Cypress court
also had to find there would be irreparable harm if the injunction
was not granted.176 The Cypress court accepted the argument that
preventing Eddy from attending school with Caleb was damaging
to the bond between Caleb and Eddy and would disrupt the service
animal relationship.177 The Cypress court ordered that the
plaintiffs in the case would be required to post a $50,000 bond
before the injunction would become effective.178
Cypress, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 88287, at *11.
Id. at *11–13.
173 Id. at *15. The school district also argued that it “would have to teach the
remaining students to ignore the dog.” Id.
174 Id. at *13.
175 Cypress, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 88287, at *14.
176 Id. at *17.
177 Id. The Cypress court stated that “the Ninth Circuit presumes irreparable
harm when a plaintiff shows a likelihood of success for violation of a civil rights
statute. Id. at *17–18 (citing to Silver Sage Partners v. City of Desert Hot
Springs, 251 F.3d 814, 827 (9th Cir. 2001)). The Cypress court also found that the
“[b]alancing of equities [element] tip[ped] in favor of granting the preliminary
injunction[,]” and granting the injunction was in the public interest, completing
the preliminary injunction analysis. Id. at *19, *20.
178 Id. at *21–22. According to the docket of the case, at the plaintiff’s request,
the case was dismissed with prejudice on June 20, 2012 (approximately a year
after the preliminary injunction was granted). United States District Court for
the Central District of California (Southern Division—Santa Ana) Civil Docket
171
172
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It is noteworthy that, consistent with the DOJ’s position in other
cases, the DOJ filed a Statement of Interest in Cypress addressing
the application of Title II of the ADA.179 The Statement of Interest
cited to references supporting the importance of maintaining the
relationship between the individual with a disability and his or her
service animal.180 The DOJ reviewed the ADA service animal
regulations and its applicability to the school environment.181 The
Statement of Interest emphasized that students and their parents
have a right to choose whether a student utilizes a service dog,
even if a school district does not agree with the decision.182 The
DOJ argued that the assistance that Caleb would need with Eddy
“falls squarely within the scope of reasonable policy and practice
modifications” required by the ADA regulations and that the school
district had not shown an undue burden or fundamental alteration
of its program.183
In response to the school district’s concern over safety, the DOJ
stated that the affirmative defense of a “‘direct threat’ . . . can only
be proved where there are facts establishing a significant risk to
the health and safety of others that cannot be eliminated or reduced
to an acceptable level by the public entity’s modification of its
policies, practices, or procedures.”184 The DOJ asserted that the
school district had not met the heavy burden of showing a direct
threat.185
D. Department of Justice Civil Rights Division
Along with the documents filed by the DOE and DOJ in the cases
discussed above, another indication of the likely interpretation of
the rights a student with a disability may have to be accompanied
by his or her service animal can be found in materials resulting

for Case #: 8:11-CV-00352-AG-RNB.
179 Statement of Interest of the U.S., C.C. v. Cypress School District, No. CV
11-00352, at 1 (June 13, 2011) [hereinafter Cypress Statement of Interest].
180 Id. at 6.
181 Id. at 9–11.
182 Id. at 12–13.
183 Id. at 15–16.
184 Id. at 17–18 (emphasis in original).
185 Cypress Statement of Interest, supra note 179, at 18–19. In the service
animal context the Ninth Circuit has stated that an individual has a heavy
burden when asserting a direct threat as a basis for excluding a service animal.
Id. at 18 (citing Lockett v. Catalina Channel Express, Inc., 496 F.3d 1061, 1066
(9th Cir. 2007); Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 649–50 (1998)).
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from investigations of the DOE and DOJ.186 Both the DOJ Civil
Rights Division and the DOE OCR have jurisdiction to enforce the
ADA and investigate complaints of disability discrimination in
connection with schools.187 The DOE “OCR engages in complaint[s]
resolution,
compliance
reviews,
directed
investigations,
enforcement actions, and technical assistance” while the DOJ’s
“Civil Rights Division engages in selective investigation of
complaints, out-of-court settlements, and litigation in federal
court.”188
1. Gates-Chili Central School District
A Letter of Findings dated April 13, 2015, from U.S. Department
of Justice’s Civil Rights Division to the Gates-Chili Central School
District (New York) (“Letter of Findings”) illustrated the DOJ’s
position regarding the extent to which a school district may be
required to provide assistance to a student in handling his or her
service animal.189 In the Letter of Findings, the DOJ investigation
focused on the refusal of the Gates-Chili School District (“GCSD”)
to allow Devyn Pereira to bring her service dog, Hannah,190 unless
her parent, Pereira, employs a full-time handler for the dog.191
Pereira asserted that she was asking only that the GCSD “provide
minimal and intermittent assistance” to Devyn so Devyn can

186 See infra notes 189–242 (discussing administrative actions); see also
Information About Filing a Complaint with the U.S. Department of Justice, Civil
Rights Division and the U.S. Department of Education, Office for Civil Rights,
JUSTICE.GOV, 1, http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/edu/documents/filecomp.pdf (last
visited Sept. 3, 2015) [hereinafter Information About Filing] (general information
about DOJ’s common goals in education).
187 Information About Filing, supra note 186, at 9. Only the DOJ Civil Rights
Division has the authority to investigate disability discrimination allegations in
schools that do not receive federal financial assistance. Id.
188 Id.
189 Letter from Rebecca B. Bond, Chief, Disability Rights Section, Civil Rights
Division, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to David W. Oakes, Harris Beach PLLC (Apr. 13,
2015) at 1, 5 [hereinafter Letter of Findings], http://www.ada.gov/briefs/gateschili_lof.pdf (regarding Investigation of the Gates-Chili Central School District,
DJ No. 204-53-128).
190 Devyn Pereira was identified only as D.P. in the Letter of Findings;
however, media reports identified her and her service dog by name. Id. at 1;
David Andreatta, Gates Chili Challenges Service Dog Ruling, DEMOCRAT &
CHRONICLE (Apr. 29, 2015),
http://www.democratandchronicle.com/story/news/2015/04/29/service-dog-devynpereira-gates-chili/26569961/.
191 Letter of Findings, supra note 189, at 1.
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handle Hannah.192
The DOJ initially set forth the areas in which there appear to be
no dispute among the parties.193 “[Devyn] is a person with a
disability[,]”194 and Hannah was a service animal that performs
numerous tasks directly related to Devyn’s disabilities.195
Although Devyn was accompanied by Hannah during her
Preschool year, when Devyn was scheduled to begin her
Kindergarten year, Pereira was told that she needed to provide a
separate adult handler.196 Pereira did so at her own cost but
requested in writing that the GCSD permit Devyn’s one-on-one
aide (already provided by the school district) to assist Devyn in
issuing commands and tethering and untethering Hannah.197
The DOJ set forth the relevant service animal regulations and
stated that the GCSD had acknowledged that there had never been
an incident where Hannah “was out of control or exhibited any
indication of not being house broken in the four years” that
Hannah had been coming to school with Devyn.198 The DOJ stated
that “[c]are and supervision is a distinct responsibility and
different from handling.”199 Because Hannah “does not require any
walking, feeding, grooming, or veterinary care while [Devyn] is at
school[,]” the DOJ stated that care and supervision is not an issue
in this situation.200
In regards to the assistance that Pereira requested, the DOJ
asserted that the request was reasonable given the current support
Devyn is being provided.201 The DOJ also stated the GCSD had
“not established that the provision of reasonable modifications to
assist [Devyn] would fundamentally alter the nature of the service,
Id.
Id. at 1 ̶ 2.
194 Id. at 1. Among other issues, Devyn has autism, epilepsy, and asthma. Her
service dog Hannah was chosen in part because the dog’s breed (Bouvier) is
considered hypoallergenic. Id. at 2; Andreatta, supra note 190.
195 Letter of Findings, supra note 189, at 2. The tasks include alerting for
seizures, preventing wandering, deep pressure, and mobility support. Id.
196 Id. at 3.
197 Id. at 3, 4.
198 Id. at 5.
199 Id. at 5 n.8 (citing to 28 C.F.R. § 35.136(e) (2011) and the guidance at
Appendix A § 35.136).
200 Letter of Findings, supra note 189, at 5 n.8.
201 Id. at 5 (given Devyn’s one-on-one aide currently escorts Devyn, Hannah,
and her adult handler around the school). “Staff assistance in issuing the few
verbal commands necessary for D.P. to control the Service Dog would involve only
minimal effort but would significantly further D.P.’s ability to use the assistance
of the Service Dog.” Id.
192
193
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program, or activity.”202
In a footnote, the DOJ directly addressed the possible issue of
the intersection of federal laws stating “because the IDEA and
ADA have different standards, whether or not the IDEA’s
requirements have been met does not determine whether a valid
ADA claim would exist.”203
The DOJ then instructed GCSD to permit Devyn to act as
handler of Hannah and to direct staff in the classroom and on the
bus to provide reasonable modifications as Devyn handles
Hannah.204
The DOJ advised the GCSD that it may initiate a lawsuit if there
is no resolution of the matter.205 The GCSD’s response was to ask
the DOJ for clarity with the position the DOJ has adopted because
the GCSD believed the DOJ’s “interpretations of the rules
concerning service dogs . . . are at odds with the language and
application of the existing officially published ADA . . . rules.”206
2. Delran Township School District
In a Settlement Agreement between the United States of
America and the Delran Township School District (New Jersey)
(“DTSD”),207 the DOJ determined that the DTSD had discriminated
against an eight-year-old child due to its refusal to permit the child
to be accompanied in school by his service animal when the parent
was present as the dog’s handler.208
The Delran Settlement Agreement was based on the DOJ’s
authorization to bring a civil action to enforce Title II of the ADA,
Id. at 6.
Id. at 2 n.1.
204 Id. at 6. The reasonable modifications include, but are not limited to,
tethering and untethering, issuing commands, and escorting Devyn on school
grounds. Letter of Findings, supra note 189, at 6.
205 Id. at 7.
206 District Statement to Service Dog Findings, GATES CHILI SCH. DISTRICT,
http://www.gateschili.org/news.cfm?story=1896 (last visited Sept. 3, 2015). The
DOJ filed a Complaint on September 29, 2015 alleging that the school district
violated Title II of the ADA and requesting, among other things, that the school
district permit Devyn to act as a handler of her service dog with assistance from
school staff. Complaint, U.S. v. Gates-Chili Central School District, No. 6:15-cv06583-CJS (W.D.N.Y. Sept. 19, 2015).
207 Settlement Agreement under the Americans with Disabilities Act Between the
U. S. of Am. & Delran Township Sch. Dist. (DJ# 204-48-284) (June 24, 2014)
[hereinafter Delran Settlement Agreement], http://www.ada.gov/delran-sa.htm.
208 The eight-year-old boy was not identified in the settlement agreement or in
media reports; however, he was described as having several disabilities including
autism and encephalopathy. Id.
202
203
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and the DOJ stated it was not addressing any rights and
responsibilities under the IDEA.209 The DTSD initially requested
medical records to support the use of the service dog and stated the
dog would only be admitted if “deemed necessary by the child’s IEP
team.”210 However, after the parent objected to the assertion that
the IDEA process would be used and asked for a copy of the DTSD
service animal policy (there was no policy in existence at the time),
the DTSD stated that the request would be viewed as one for “a
‘general accommodation.’”211
The DTSD requested further information, including
documentation of the dog’s license, veterinary certification that the
dog was vaccinated, and more specific information about the work
or tasks the dog had been trained to perform.212 Ultimately the
DTSD “never allowed the child to be accompanied by his service
dog at school or during school-related activities.”213 The Settlement
Agreement stated that internal DTSD e-mails demonstrated that
its “officials considered improper factors such as generalized
concerns about student allergies and fear of dogs as justification
for refusing to grant the child’s request for a reasonable
modification.”214 The Settlement Agreement also stated that the
DTSD “lodged a series of unnecessary and burdensome requests
for information and documentation, some of which were redundant
and others of which were outside the scope of permitted inquiry as
set forth in the ADA regulations.”215
The DTSD disputed the DOJ’s findings of facts, and, without
admitting liability or wrong-doing, agreed to actions including
establishing a service animal policy, providing training to its staff,
and record-keeping.216 The DTSD also paid $10,000 to the parent
complainant.217
209

Id.

210 Id.

Id.
Id.
213 Delran Settlement Agreement, supra note 207. In addition to not allowing the
service animal at school, the DOJ discussed a specific instance of the service
animal not being allowed to accompany the child on a school trip, with the
“articulated reason for [the] refusal . . . that it did not have adequate time to
prepare for the presence of the service animal on the bus and field trip, or to
address any concerns of other students and staff.” Id.
214 Id.
215 Id.
216 Id. The DTSD also was required to provide such records to the DOJ quarterly
for the three year duration of the agreement. Id.
217 Delran Settlement Agreement, supra note 207.
211
212
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3. The Learning Clinic
The Settlement Agreement between the DOJ and The Learning
Clinic, Inc. (“TLC”) in Connecticut provides an example of how
these issues may be resolved under Title III of the ADA.218 As
discussed earlier, the ADA Title II and Title III service animal
regulations consist of the same language.219 TLC is a private,
nonprofit corporation that is considered a place of public
accommodation under Title III of the ADA.220 Among other services
TLC provides residential boarding services.221 The complainants
alleged that TLC failed to provide reasonable modifications in
connection with their request that their child with multiple
disabilities be allowed to live and attend school with his service
animal.222
In response to the request, TLC required the complainants to
provide documentation to support the request that the service dog
be allowed at the school including a certificate of liability
insurance.223
The complainants rejected TLC’s terms and
withdrew their child from the school.224 The DOJ concluded that
TLC violated the ADA “by requiring documentation of the animal’s
certification or training, medical verification, and other conditions
amounting to a surcharge.”225 TLC denied the allegations in the
complaint; however, it agreed to resolve the matter through the
TLC Settlement Agreement.226
The TLC Settlement Agreement states that TLC will modify its
policies to permit the use of service animals in accordance with the
ADA.227 Specifically, “[w]hen a person with a disability is
accompanied by a service animal, TLC shall not ask about the
nature or extent of the person’s disability, require documentation
of the animal’s certification or training, or require the payment of

Settlement Agreement between the U. S. & The Learning Clinic (DJ # 202-14133) (Mar. 14, 2014) [hereinafter TLC Settlement Agreement],
http://www.ada.gov/tlc.htm.
219 See supra notes 15–16 and accompanying text.
220 TLC Settlement Agreement, supra note 218.
221 Id.
222 Id. The child was identified as an individual with disabilities including bipolar
disorder and attention deficient hyperactivity disorder. Id.
223 Id.
224 Id.
225 TLC Settlement Agreement, supra note 218.
226 Id.
227 Id.
218

DO NOT DELETE

2016]

4/14/2016 2:25 PM

CANINES IN THE CLASSROOM REVISITED

33

a surcharge.”228 TLC also paid $35,000 to the complainants to
reimburse them for attorney’s fees and other costs.229
E. Department of Education, Office for Civil Rights
Because of the differences in the enforcement tools, the results
of the processes used by the DOE OCR may not be as visible;
however, recent actions taken by that agency can be useful in
considering a school’s obligation to accommodate students with
disabilities.230
There are two DOE OCR Resolution Agreements in 2010 (prior
to the new ADA service animal regulations becoming effective) that
discussed the use of the IEP process in connection with a student’s

Id.
Id.
230 The focus of this Article is on access for students utilizing service animals;
however, the DOE OCR has also acted in situations wherein a visitor to a school
utilizing a service animal has had issues. In a 2012 Settlement Agreement with
the Hillsboro, Oregon School District [Hillsboro], and the DOE OCR, Hillsboro
agreed to review and revise its “policies and procedures as they related to the use
of service animals to ensure consistency with Title II.” Settlement Agreement
between the U.S. Department of Education, Office for Civil Rights and the
Hillsboro School District 1J, dated Mar. 21, 2012, (No. 10-11-1048), 59 IDELR 82
(2012) (begins on p.490, at 493). This appears to be the same school district
involved in a dispute regarding the use of service dog by a student a few years
earlier discussed supra notes 226–27 and accompanying text. The Hillsboro
Settlement Agreement was the result of a complaint by a parent volunteer who
utilized a service animal being asked questions supporting the need for a service
animal and requiring the parent to provide certification of the dog’s training,
vaccinations, and documentation of insurance coverage. Id. at 491. Other
volunteers were not asked provide evidence of insurance and were covered under
the school district’s policy. Id. at 492. The DOE OCR cited to the then new Title
II regulations to find that when the parent volunteer was asked to provide proof
of insurance for her service animal and other conditions were placed on her
presence in the school, the school district exceeded what is necessary and
appropriate under Title II. Id. at 492. Although relating to a parent rather than
a student, the DOE OCR’s citation of the limited inquiries that a school may
make, and limited circumstances wherein a service animal may be excluded from
a premises support the argument that the DOE OCR will closely follow the ADA
service animal regulations when considering these issues in the future. See, e.g.,
id. In a subsequent Resolution Agreement the DOE OCR addressed the issue
again in the context of an allegation by a grandparent that a school had
discriminated against him by “not allowing full participation in the end of the
year celebrations for his grandson (Student) due to the presence of his service
animal.” Letter and Resolution Agreement between U.S. Department of
Education, Office for Civil Rights and Alpine Union Elementary School District,
dated July 19, 2012, (No. 0912-1391), 112 LRP 49101 (2012). The Alpine School
District agreed to update its policy to reflect the new ADA regulations and provide
staff training to be reviewed by the DOE OCR. Id.
228
229
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request for a service animal.231 However, in 2012, in a letter
associated with a DOE OCR Resolution Agreement focusing on the
provision of assistive technology and parent communication, the
DOE OCR addressed the issue of a service animal utilizing Title II
of the ADA rather than the IDEA or a student’s IEP.232 In that
letter to the Pasadena California Unified School District, the DOE
OCR considered the issue of whether the district had a policy
against the use of guide dogs.233 According to the DOE OCR
investigation, there was evidence that a parent had been told by a
teacher that guide dogs were prohibited at the school, the school
district told the DOE OCR that “guide dogs are not provided to
persons who are under 16 years old” and the school district did not
have a formal policy on service animals.234 The DOE OCR
determined that the parent never requested to bring a guide dog to
the school and found that there was insufficient evidence to
establish that the school district had a policy against students
using guide dogs.235 The DOE OCR did provide technical assistance
by reminding the school district:
individuals with disabilities are not required to obtain the District’s
approval before bringing a service animal onto campus. Title II
provides individuals with disabilities a right to be accompanied by
service animals except in very limited circumstances such as when
the service animal is out of control and the animal’s handler does
not take effective action to control it, or the animal is not
housebroken. Absent these conditions, individuals with disabilities
including students must be allowed to bring a service animal to
school. Policies, procedures or practices that explicitly or implicitly
lead a parent to believe that District pre-approval of the service

231 Resolution Agreement between U.S. Department of Education, Office for
Civil Rights and Colorado Springs (CO) School District #11, dated Nov. 15, 2010,
56 IDELR 52 (2011) (beginning on p. 270, at 272) (finding that the school district
failed to comply with applicable law and regulations when it did not consider
whether the presence of a service dog should be incorporated into a student’s IEP);
Resolution Agreement between U.S. Department of Education, Office for Civil
Rights and Trinity Area (PA) School District, dated Sept. 17, 2010, (No. 03-081279), 56 IDELR 143 (2011) (beginning p.721, at 721) (finding an IEP team’s
consideration of a service animal request inadequate).
232 Letter and Resolution Agreement between U.S. Department of Education,
Office for Civil Rights and Pasadena (CA) Unified School District, dated Aug. 17,
2012, (No. 09-11-1054), 60 IDELR 22 (2012) (beginning on p. 86, at 86).
233 Id. at 90.
234 Id. The school district also informed the DOE OCR that the student did not
possess certain skills necessary to handle a guide dog. Id.
235 Id. at 91 (emphasis added).
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animal is necessary violate Title II.236

In 2013, in response to a complaint that a school district
“constrained” a student’s ability to use a service animal, the DOE
OCR entered into a Voluntary Resolution Agreement with School
Administrative Unit No. 23 (New Hampshire) (“SAU #23”) before
the DOE OCR reached a compliance determination.237 There was
no mention of the IDEA or the student’s IEP plan in the
accompanying letter or agreement.238 In the Voluntary Resolution
Agreement SAU #23 agreed to revise its service animal policy to
comply with Title II and disseminate it to all members of the school
community.239 In connection with the student’s use of the service
dog, SAU #23 agreed to “designate a staff member or outside aide
or paraprofessional who will be responsible for issuing commands
as needed and ensuring Carina [the service dog] accompany the
Student during transitions . . . .”240 SAU #23 also agreed to
contract with a service dog trainer to develop a training program
and provide at school training for the aide.241 Note that entering
into a voluntary resolution agreement with the DOE OCR is no
guarantee that things will go smoothly in the future. As recently
as April 2014, there were media reports that SAU #23 was
asserting that it was not obligated to “handle” Carina and the
family would be required provide an outside handler.242
F. Informal Resolution of Disputes
There is no way to track the number of occurrences where there
is initially conflict over whether a service animal will be allowed in
236 Id. at 91 (emphasis added). One of the teachers had provided an opinion as
to the student not being a good candidate for a service dog when the parent asked
the teacher to complete a form requested by a service animal school. The DOE
OCR letter also stated “[w]hen a parent requests the District to complete a form
that is required by a guide dog school, the District should complete and return the
form but may and should provide honest feedback and opinions if solicited on the
form.” Id.
237 Letter and Voluntary Resolution Agreement between U.S. Department of
Education, Office for Civil Rights and School Administrative Unit No. 23 (SAU
#23), dated May 22, 2013, 113 LRP 32108 (2013).
238 Id.
239 Id.
240 Id. at II (A).
241 Id. at II (B–E).
242 Maggie Cassidy, Who Handles Carina? Service Dog for North Haverhill Boy
at Center of Dispute Between Family, School District, VALLEY NEWS (Apr. 6, 2014),
http://www.vnews.com/home/11250452-95/service-dog-for-north-haverhill-boyat-center-of-dispute-between-family-school-district.
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a school.243 These cases may be resolved informally even if a
complaint has been filed with the DOJ or DOE.244 An example was
a dispute beginning in 2010 in which the Hillsboro, Oregon, school
district initially refused to allow a student with autism to be
accompanied by his service dog.245 After a disability rights
organization and the DOJ became involved, the school district
reconsidered its stance and allowed the student to bring the dog to
school.246
The role of the media also cannot be understated in these cases.
In 2013 in Athens, Ohio, a dispute over allowing a student’s service
dog in a classroom where the teacher had a severe allergy to dog
dander garnered significant media attention.247 Although both
243 See generally U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Civil Rights Div., Disabilities Rights
(Oct.
7,
2008),
Section,
Enforcing
the
ADA,
ADA.GOV
http://www.ada.gov/aprjun06.htm
(discussing
requirement
of
informal
settlements as a mechanism for resolving disputes before the Department of
Justice may file a lawsuit).
244 For example, although there were media reports that the DOE OCR was
investigating the Cabot School District in Arkansas, the Author was unable to
locate any official settlement agreement. See generally Christina Corbin,
Arkansas Family, School District Spar Over Cost of Service Dog for Epileptic Boy,
FOXNEWS (July 12, 2014), http://www.foxnews.com/us/2014/07/12/arkansasfamily-school-district-spar-over-cost-service-dog-for-epileptic-boy/ (reporting that
parents had filed a complaint with the DOE OCR); Ben Velderman, School
Charged Family $500 a Month to Allow Son’s Service Dog in Classroom, EAG
NEWS.ORG (July 9, 2014), http://eagnews.org/suit-school-charged-family-500-amonth-to-allow-sons-service-dog-in-classroom/ (discussing dispute in Cabot,
Arkansas, and reporting that the school district was requiring parents to pay for
a handler for the student’s service animal).
245 See Wendy Owen, Dog Helps Stabilize Autistic Boy’s Life, but Hillsboro
School Says Not in the Classroom, OREGONIAN/OREGONLIVE (Jan. 10, 2010),
http://www.oregonlive.com/washingtoncounty/index.ssf/2010/01/dog_helps_stabil
ize_an_autisic.html.
246 See Kurt Eckert, Hillsboro Service Dog Adds Class to Resume,
(Mar.
9,
2011,
10:10
AM),
OREGONIAN/OREGONLIVE
http://www.oregonlive.com/argus/index.ssf/2011/03/hillsboro_service_dog_adds_c
la.html; see also Dep’y of Justice, Office of Pub. Affairs, Press Release, Hillsboro
School District Agrees to Access for Autism Service Dog (Mar. 7, 2011),
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/hillsboro-school-district-agrees-access-autismservice-dog (stating “the school board’s vote shows a good faith effort to
voluntarily resolve this dispute without more formal action by the department”).
247 See Sara Brumfield, Teacher’s Allergy Disrupts Plans for Autistic Girl,
Service
Dog,
THE
ATHENS
MESSENGER
(Aug.
23,
2013),
http://www.athensmessenger.com/news/teacher-s-allergy-disrupts-plans-forautistic-girl-service-dog/article_5b4859e2-a4b1-568a-adb8-acc649e08556.html;
see also Mary Beth Lane, Autistic Girl in Athens Told to Transfer Schools Over
COLUMBUS
DISPATCH
(Aug,
23,
2013),
Service
Dog,
THE
http://www.dispatch.com/content/stories/local/2013/08/23/autistic-girl-in-athenstold-to-transfer-schools-over-service-dog.html (reporting on dispute between
student and teacher); Jim Phillips, Dispute Over Student’s Service Dog Gets Big
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parties articulated that they felt the law supported their position,
they came to resolution within a few weeks of the story being
released to the media.248 Another example occurred in 2011 when
in Fairfax County, Virginia, school officials agreed to allow an
epileptic twelve-year-old boy to bring his service animal to school
after the family appeared on the TODAY Show.249
Given these governmental actions and the recent cases, it
appears that school districts continue to struggle to determine the
actions they must take to assist students utilizing service
animals.250 Arguments by school districts that there must be
exhaustion of administrative remedies under the IDEA is likely to
delay any consideration of ADA claims in court, especially in the
states falling within the Second and Sixth Circuits given the
appellate decisions in those circuits.251
Attention
in
Media,
THE
ATHENS
NEWS
(Aug.
25,
2103),
http://www.athensnews.com/news/local/dispute-over-student-s-service-dog-getsbig-attention-in/article_e6d9730d-b8ac-5e56-bfbd-7ccf71085566.html (reporting
on media attention); Arian Smedley, Girl with Autism and Service Dog to Attend
Beacon
School,
THE
ATHENS
MESSENGER
(Sept.
4,
2013),
http://www.athensmessenger.com/news/girl-with-autism-and-service-dog-toattend-beacon-school/article_e926a2f1-c2e9-5b1b-85ac-63be7a503ebb.html
(reporting on dispute and resolution).
248 Phillips, supra note 247 (discussing the media attention to the issue);
Smedley, supra note 247 (discussing resolution of conflict allowing student with
service dog to attend a different school than what was initially proposed).
249 See, e.g., School to Allow 12-Year-Old Epileptic Boy’s Service Dog, TODAY
(Jan. 4, 2011), http://www.today.com/id/40918878/ns/today-today_health/t/schoolallow--year-old-epileptic-boys-service-dog/#.VYGyXesqcyE (discussing resolution
of dispute in Fairfax County, Virginia, where a school agreed to allow a service
dog at school on a trial basis after the family appeared on a network morning
news program). Reportedly the school district’s policy at the time required the dog
be trained by a specific training school. Id. The current regulations of the ADA
only require that a dog be “individually trained”—not that a dog be trained by a
specific facility or any professional facility at all. 28 C.F.R. § 35.104 (2014); 28
C.F.R. § 36.104 (2014). The current Fairfax County Public School policy does not
include that limitation. See Fairfax County Public Schools, Regulation 2125,
Special Services, Health and Welfare, Animals on School Property and Other
Fairfax
County
Public
Schools
(FCPS)
Buildings,
http://www.boarddocs.com/vsba/fairfax/Board.nsf/files/8R5LR257BA5C/$file/R21
25.pdf.
250 See supra notes 29–170 and accompanying text.
251 See, e.g., GM v. Massapequa Union Free Sch. Dist., No. 14-CV-4126(JS),
2015 WL 4069201, at *3–5 (E.D.N.Y July 2, 2015) (citing to the Second Circuit
Cave case, discussed supra note 54, among others to find that the federal claims
a student brought relating to his treatment at school would be subject to the IDEA
administrative exhaustion requirement and thus those claims would be
dismissed); Donoho v. Smith Cty Bd. of Educ., 21 Fed. Appx. 293, 294–99 (6th Cir.
2001) (affirming the dismissal of the case in the lower court for failure to exhaust
and discussing the exhaustion requirement and characterizing the exceptions to
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However, based on the documents memorializing their
administrative activities, in the DOE and DOJ’s view, Section 504
and the ADA may act as an independent basis for bringing a
complaint.252 In addition, when applying the ADA, the federal
agencies distinguished between the role of handler and what a
layperson may consider the caretaker of a service dog.253 In
multiple situations, the students were already provided significant
support from aides, and it may be viewed as just another
reasonable accommodation for such aides to assist with the service
dog.254
IV. STATE LAWS PROVIDING ACCESS FOR STUDENTS UTILIZING
SERVICE DOGS255
Because of the possible intersection of the IDEA and ADA (thus
the likelihood a school district will raise the exhaustion of
administrative remedies argument), and exceptions in the ADA
regulations regarding access for students with service animals,
individuals may utilize state laws to demand access for their
service animals in schools.256 This Part will discuss various ways
state laws can provide a remedy in addition to the federal laws
discussed above.
An individual may rely on a general access provision regarding
persons with disabilities having the right to be accompanied by a

the requirement as narrow). The Second Circuit consists of the states of New
York, Vermont, and Connecticut, and the Sixth Circuit consists of the states of
Michigan, Ohio, Kentucky, and Tennessee. Geographical Boundaries of the
United States Courts of Appeals and United States District Courts, U.S. COURTS,
www.uscourts.gov/file/document/us-federal-courts-circuit-map (last visited July
8, 2015).
252 See supra notes 189–241 (discussing administrative activities).
253 See, e.g., Alboniga v. Sch. Bd. of Broward Cnty. Fla., 87 F. Supp. 3d 1319,
1341–44 (S.D. Fla. 2015) (discussing the DOJ’s guidance, the ADA regulations,
and the difference between handling and control, and care and supervision).
254 See, e.g., id. at 1344.
255 This Article is providing information on some of the state laws in existence
at the time of the writing of the article in June 2015, and readers are cautioned
that these laws can change significantly within a short time. A good starting
point for reviewing state laws on service animals can be found at the website of
the Animal Legal & Historical Center based at Michigan State University. It
publishes a table of state statutes. Rebecca F. Wisch, Table of Assistance Animal
Laws, MICH. STATE UNIV., ANIMAL LEGAL & HISOTORICAL CTR.,
https://www.animallaw.info/topic/table-state-assistance-animal-laws (2014).
256 See, e.g., supra note 251 and accompanying text (discussing challenge of
exhaustion requirements in 6th and 2nd Circuits).
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service animal.257 In addition, a number of states have passed
legislation specifically allowing for students to be accompanied by
their service animals in schools.258
A. General State Laws
Several state laws providing persons with disabilities with
access include in a list of the types of entities that must provide a
reasonable accommodation for “educational institutions.”259 In the
State of Virginia, the addition of such language led to the Virginia
Department of Education issuing comprehensive guidelines for
service animals in schools.260
Some states have language in their statutes that could be used
to strengthen an argument that the intent of the legislature is to
allow for students to be accompanied by their service animals in
schools.261 For example, California law states, “service dogs trained
to provide assistance to individuals with a disability may be
transported in a schoolbus [sic] when accompanied by disabled
pupils enrolled in a public or private school.”262 Although there is
no language in the general access provision referencing public
schools,263 logically why would a student be allowed to transport his
or her service dog on a school bus if the dog was not allowed to be
257 See infra notes 259–70 and accompanying text. See generally David R. Hill
et al., Students with Autism, Service Dogs, and Public Schools: A Review of State
Laws, 25 J. DISABILITY POL’Y STUD. 106 (2014) (reviewing state laws as they relate
to autism service animals).
258 See infra notes 271–99 and accompanying text.
259 E.g., N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 167-D:1 (2015) (listing as a place of public
accommodation “any kindergarten, primary and secondary school, trade or
business school, high school, academy, college and university, or any educational
institution under the supervision of the state board of education, or the
commissioner of education in the state of New Hampshire); VA. CODE ANN. § 51.544 (2015) (listing “public entities including schools”); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9 § 4501
(2015) (places of public accommodation “means any school. . . .”); WASH. REV. CODE
ANN. § 49.60.040(2) (LexisNexis 2015) (listing as a place of public accommodation
an educational institution). Note that it is not uncommon to exclude educational
facilities that are operated by “a bona fide religious or sectarian institution” from
the types of entities that must accommodate service animals. See, e.g., N.H. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 167-D:3 (2015).
260 See Va. Dep’t of Educ., Guidelines for School Division Policy and Procedures
Regarding
Service
Animals
in
Virginia
Schools,
http://www.doe.virginia.gov/special_ed/tech_asst_prof_dev/guidance_service_dog
.pdf (last visited June 18, 2015). For a detailed discussion of those guidelines. See
Huss, Classroom, supra note 3, at 46–49.
261 See infra notes 262–66 and accompanying text.
262 CAL. EDUC. CODE § 39839 (West 2015).
263 See CAL. CIV. CODE § 54.1 (West 2015) (listing private schools).
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in the classroom as well?264 Another example would be state laws
where “autism service dog” is included in the type of service animal
or when defining individuals with disabilities, including autism in
the description.265 By recognizing the validity of autism service
animals, an argument can be made that individuals utilizing such
dogs should have equal access to accommodations.266
The ability to “cobble together” an argument that is complicated
by the fact that state laws can change quickly and there is not
always consistency within the statutes.267 For example, although
the State of Indiana’s code includes “autism service animal”
language, it was recently revised to delete educational institutions
from the list of establishments required to allow persons with
disabilities to be accompanied by their service animals.268 Thus, by
leaving out or removing schools from the list of establishments, a
negative inference could be made as well.269 Note that there may
be an intersection of special education laws and general access
laws at the state level that could complicate the analysis.270

264 See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 365.5 (West 2015) (listing private schools as a
type of public accommodation).
265 See, e.g., Bill Text IN H.B. 1603 (2009) (including in the definition of service
animal “an animal trained as an autism service animal”); LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 46:1952 (2014) (defining a service dog as including “an autism service dog”);
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 955.011 (LexisNexis 2015) (including in the definition of
mobility impaired person a person diagnosed with autism). But see infra note 267
and accompanying text (discussing recent changes to the Indiana law).
266 See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 46:1952 (2014) (defining a service dog as
including “an autism service dog”).
267 See, e.g., 2015 IND. LEGIS. SERV. P.L. 233-2015 (S.E.A. 500) (West); IND.
CODE ANN. § 16-32-3-2 (West 2015) (showing a recent change in the state law).
268 As part of a comprehensive deregulation of education, the State of Indiana
removed schools from the list of public accommodations that are required to
provide access to persons with disabilities. 2015 IND. LEGIS. SERV. P.L. 233-2015
(S.E.A. 500) (West) (removing a list of educational facilities from the
establishments considered public accommodations in IND. CODE ANN. § 16-32-3-2
(West 2015)).
269 See 2015 IND. LEGIS. SERV. P.L. 233-2015 (S.E.A. 500) (West); IND. CODE
ANN.§ 16-32-3-2 (West 2015).
270 See, e.g., VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9 § 4502(g) (2015) (stating that the chapter
regarding public accommodations shall not apply to “special education claims and
issues covered by federal and State special education laws, regulations, and
procedures”).
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B. State Laws Specifically Allowing for Service Animal Access
in Schools
1. Illinois
Illinois law states “[s]ervice animals such as guide dogs, signal
dogs or any other animal individually trained to perform tasks for
the benefit of a student with a disability shall be permitted to
accompany that student at all school functions, whether in or
outside the classroom.”271 If a purported service animal does not
“perform tasks” for a student, a school district could refuse to
permit the animal access to the school.272 The Illinois law was
analyzed in two cases decided in 2009 and 2010.273
In the Kalbfleisch case, the parents of a student with autism
successfully sued based on the Illinois law for a preliminary
injunction to compel the school district to allow the student to bring
his service animal to school.274 The Kalbfleisch case was initially
filed in state court; the school district successfully removed the
case to federal court, and the federal court remanded the case back
to state court.275 The federal district court found that remand back
to state court was appropriate because it determined the complaint
was based on Illinois state law and there was “nothing in the IDEA
to suggest that it was intended to displace all state law with
respect to the education of disabled persons,” thus the school
district’s preemption argument failed.276 Upon remand, the state
appellate court affirmed the circuit court’s grant of the preliminary
injunction.277 In addition to analyzing whether the Kalbfleischs
had met the standards to support the preliminary injunction, the
Illinois appellate court rejected the school district’s argument that
it was necessary to exhaust administrative remedies because the
lower court found that the student “would be subject to irreparable
harm and that any other process would be inadequate due to time
105 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 5/14-6.02 (2015).
28 C.F.R. § 35.104 (2014); 28 C.F.R. § 36.104 (2014); see Huss, Context,
supra note 6, at 1175–79 (discussing the “perform task” language in the ADA
regulations).
273 K.D. v. Villa Grove Cmty. Unit Sch. Dist. No. 302 Bd. of Educ., 936 N.E.2d
690, 692 (Ill. App. Ct. 2010); Kalbfleisch v. Columbia Cmty. Unit Sch. Dist. Unit
No. 4, 920 N.E.2d 651, 654 (S.D. Ill. 2009).
274 Kalbfleisch v. Columbia Cmty. Unit Sch. Dist. No. 4, 644 F. Supp. 2d 1084,
1086 (S.D. Ill. 2009).
275 Id.
276 Kalbfleisch, 644 F. Supp. 2d at 1089–90.
277 Kalbfleisch, 920 N.E.2d at 664.
271
272
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constraints.”278
In K.D. v. Villa Grove Community Unit School Dist. No. 302
Board of Education, the Illinois appellate court affirmed a circuit
court decision ordering a school district to allow a child with autism
(Kaleb Drew) to be accompanied by his service dog, Chewey, at
school.279 As with the Kalbflesich case, the Villa Grove School
District (“Villa Grove”) argued that Kaleb (through his parents)
was required to exhaust his administrative remedies before he
could bring the suit.280 The Villa Grove court rejected this
argument stating the “case at bar presents a single question:
whether Chewey constitutes a service animal under the Illinois
School Code, a matter irrelevant to any educational benefit he
provides [Kaleb].”281 The Illinois appellate court established that
Chewey was a service animal that was individually trained to
perform tasks for Kaleb, even if Chewey’s behavior had varied from
his training as the statute “does not specify service animals must
behave perfectly at all times.”282 Of special note, given the recent
cases based on the ADA concerning the status of a student acting
as a handler, the Villa Grove court found that the Illinois statutory
language stating a service animal may “accompany” a student did
not require the student “control” the service animal and, thus, it
was not necessary that Kaleb control or handle Chewey.283
A December 2014 Impartial Due Process Hearing Decision by
the Illinois State Board of Education illustrates that even with
access guaranteed by the Illinois law, integrating a service dog into
a school can be challenging.284 This decision documents conflicts a
student had with a teacher who also utilized a service animal,
based on the teacher’s belief that the student’s service dog was not
278 Id. at 658. For a more detailed account of the Kalbfleisch case, see Huss,
Classroom, supra note 3 at 40–45.
279 K.D. v. Villa Grove Cmty. Unit Sch. Dist. No. 302 Bd. of Educ., 936 N.E.2d
690, 692 (Ill. App. Ct. 2010); Zach Miners, For Students with Autism, Having
Service Animal in School is ‘Lifesaver’, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT (Nov. 25,
2009, 9:00 AM), http://www.usnews.com/education/articles/2009/11/25/forstudent-with-autism-having-service-animal-in-school-is-lifesaver
(identifying
student in case and discussing lower court ruling).
280 Villa Grove, 936 N.E.2d at 697.
281 Id.
282 Id. at 699.
283 Id. at 699–700.
284 See Kellsey McGuire, ISBE Case No. 2014-0396, 2–3, 7–9, 37, (Illinois State
Board of Education December 18, 2014) (final determination and order),
https://localtvwqad.files.wordpress.com/2014/12/click-here-to-read-the-illinoisboard-of-education-decision-regarding-jasper-the-sherrard-service-dog1.pdf
[hereinafter Sherrard Hearing Decision].
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properly trained.285 Among other remedies, the school district was
ordered to reimburse the parents for tuition costs incurred when
they decided to send the student to a private school after the dog
was banned from the school.286 As of April 2015, the school district
was continuing to appeal the decision.287
2. New Jersey
The New Jersey legislature included legislative findings and
declarations when it adopted language regarding service animals
in schools that became effective in January 2012.288 It states:
in addition to their traditional roles, service animals can be trained
to be a calming influence and provide a connection to the familiar in
unfamiliar surroundings for students with autism or other
developmental disabilities; under the federal Americans with
Disabilities Act of 1990, service animals are permitted in schools, . . .
allowing a student with autism or other disability to bring a service
animal to class and on school grounds will enhance the learning
process and help the student reach his full academic potential.289

When the New Jersey governor signed the legislation, he raised
a concern about allergies:
I am concerned about the well-being [sic] of children who may be
allergic to service animals that are brought into a classroom. It is
one of the highest priorities of this Administration that all children
are afforded a safe and comfortable environment in which to be
educated. Therefore, I urge school districts to make reasonable
accommodations for children who suffer from allergies to animals,
and who may be affected by the introduction of a service animal into
the classroom. With the expectation for these accommodations, I am
hereby signing the bill.290
285 Id. at 3, 7–9. The Sherrard Hearing Decision’s facts indicate that the
teacher had animosity towards the student’s service dog because she trained dogs
with a competing service animal training entity. Id. at 8–9. After the student’s
service dog growled or barked at the teacher, the dog was banned from the school.
Id. at 9.
286 Id. at 37–38.
287 Chris Minor, Sherrard Superintendent Defends Decision to Appeal Service
Dog
Dispute,
WQAD8
(Apr.
15,
2015,
4:43
PM),
http://wqad.com/2015/04/15/sherrard-superintendent-defends-decision-to-appealservice-dog-dispute/ (reporting that the school district was continuing to appeal
and that the legal fees for the school district to date were about $100,000).
288 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:46-13.2 (West 2015).
289 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:46-13.2 (West 2015).
290 N.J. STAT. ANN § 18A:46-13.2 (West 2015); see N.J. STAT. ANN § 18A:46-13.2
Editors’ Notes (West 2015) (Governor Chris Christie’s statement upon signing
Senate Bill No. 1797—L.2011. c.156).

DO NOT DELETE

44

4/14/2016 2:25 PM

ALBANY GOVERNMENT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 9

The DOJ has clearly stated concerns over allergies or fear of dogs
are not valid reasons to deny access to an individual utilizing a
service animal under the ADA.291 In the event there is an
individual with allergies (whose condition rises to the level that it
is considered a disability) in the same location as an individual
utilizing a service animal, the DOJ has asserted that both
individuals must be accommodated.292
The New Jersey provision was revised to add “school buses”
(effective March 23, 2015) and currently states a “student with a
disability, including autism, shall be permitted access for a service
animal in school buildings, including the classroom, on school
buses, and on school grounds.”293 The New Jersey legislation
includes language that parallels the ADA regulations in many
ways; however, it also provides that school officials may require:
“(1) certification from a veterinarian that the service animal is
properly vaccinated and does not have a contagious disease that
may harm students or staff; and
(2) documentation that any license required by the municipality
in which the student resides has been obtained for the service
animal.”294
291 Dep’t of Justice, Civil Rights Div., ADA Requirements, Service Animals,
ADA.GOV http://www.ada.gov/service_animals_2010.htm (last visited June 25,
2015).
292 Id. A possible accommodation in a school environment would be to assign
the individuals to different rooms within the facility. Id. A redacted Resolution
Agreement with the DOE OCR supports this analysis by requiring:
the District will revise its Service Animal Policy to ensure that it
complies with the requirements of Section 504 and Title II by including
the following: (a) Allergies and fear of dogs is not a valid reason(s) for
denying access or refusing service to persons with service animals. For
example, in a classroom, they both should be accommodated by
assigning them, if possible, to different locations within the room or
different rooms in the facility.
Resolution Agreement Between Department of Education, Office for Civil Rights
and XXX County School District (OCR Docket Number 04-13-1318) (April 2,
2014),
http://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/docs/investigations/more/04131318b.pdf (last visited June 26, 2015). See generally Huss, Classroom, supra note 3,
at 19–22 (discussing the issue of allergies in a school environment).
293 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:46-13.3(a) (West 2015).
294 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:46-13.3(b) (West 2015). The remaining statutory
language is:
The service animal shall be under a handler’s control at all times by use
of a leash, tether, voice control, signal, or other suitable means. The
school shall not be responsible or liable for the care or supervision of the
service animal. The school shall provide reasonable accommodations to
allow the handler to provide for the care and feeding of the service
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3. Alabama
Alabama law provides language that directly addresses the issue
of whether an aide for a student may assist the student in handling
the service animal.295 The Alabama law states:
Every person with a disability, including a person who is totally or
partially blind, hearing-impaired, or diagnosed on the autism
spectrum shall have the right to be accompanied by a service animal
in any public place, including a public or private school, . . . . In the
case of a disabled child, including a child diagnosed on the autism
spectrum, any aide assigned to assist the child shall be trained with
the service animal in basic commands in order to assist the child as
a team.296

4. Georgia
One of the challenges of utilizing a state law is that the covered
class of persons with disabilities may be narrower than in the
ADA.297 For example, the general accommodation provision of the
Georgia law, states: “[i]n addition, if such totally or partially blind
person, physically disabled person, or deaf person is a student at a
private or public school in this state, such person shall have the
right to be accompanied by a guide dog or service dog.”298 State
laws can also narrow accommodation of service dogs in other ways.
Georgia law requires that the “guide dog or service dog must be
identified as having been trained by a school for seeing eye,
hearing, service, or guide dogs.”299
The recent adoption of state laws specifically allowing students
animal while on school grounds or at a school function.
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:46-13.3(c) (West 2015).
295 ALA. CODE § 21-7-4 (2011).
296 ALA. CODE §21.7-4(b) & (e) (2011).
297 See, e.g., MISS. CODE ANN. § 37-7-342 (2015) (authorizing service animals
utilized to detect illnesses such as diabetes and epilepsy in schools). The
Mississippi statute also provides that school administrators should “develop a
plan designed to educate other students of appropriate behavior in the presence
of such dogs, as well and the proper handling of such dogs in the presence of those
students who may have an allergic reaction to the dog . . . .” § 37-7-342
298 GA. CODE ANN. § 30-4-2(b)(1) (2015). Note the Georgia statute provides that
the person utilizing the service animal will be liable for “any damage done to the
premises or facilities by such dog.” § 30-4-2(b)(1)
299§ 30-4-2(b)(1)
In contrast, the ADA only requires a service animal be
individually trained and does not have any additional identification requirement.
See supra notes 25–30 and accompanying text (discussing the definition of service
animal in the ADA regulations); see also Frequently Asked Questions About
Service Animals, supra note 131.
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to be accompanied by their service animals illustrates the
importance that these animals play in the lives of juveniles.300 In
jurisdictions where these laws can be used, advocates should
consider bringing any claims based on the state, rather than
federal, law.
CONCLUSION
As demonstrated by the recent cases, agency actions and
legislation in this area of the law, the issue of allowing a student
to be accompanied by a service dog in school remains complex.
Parents and school officials should be aware of the continuing
possibility of a barrier to access until the time that the IDEA
administrative remedies have been exhausted—at least in some
areas of the country. However, even in those geographic areas, at
some point in time, exhaustion of administrative remedies will
occur and the issue of whether a student utilizing a service animal
must be accommodated under the ADA will need to be addressed.
Before parents and advocates acquire a service animal to assist
a child with a disability, they should consider whether the
placement is appropriate and safe for the animal both in the school
and home environment.301 Will such animal meet the definition of
service animal set forth in the ADA? If an animal is not
individually trained to do work or perform tasks for the child
(instead acts “merely” as an emotional support animal) the dog
does not meet the definition of service animal and it is not an ADA
accommodation issue.302 Advocates should be prepared to engage
in a possible lengthy process to ensure the service animal is able to
accompany the child to school.303 Are the parents willing to give up
their and their child’s privacy if media attention occurs and they
believe it would be helpful to their cause?304 Many school districts
See supra notes 271–99 and accompanying text.
See Huss, Classroom, supra note 3 at 13–19 (discussing issues regarding
partnering service animals with children).
302 See supra notes 25–28 and accompanying text (providing the definition of
service animal).
303 See, e.g., Alboniga v. Sch. Bd. Of Broward County Fla., 87 F. Supp. 3d 1319,
1323, 1324 (S.D. Fla. 2015) (discussing the multiple attempts over several years
that the child’s mother took to assure that her son, a child with multiple
disabilities, was receiving accommodation regarding his service dog).
304 It is possible to keep the name of the child private; however, as seen in many
of the cases and agency actions discussed herein, often the parents choose to
personalize the story. See, e.g., Miners, supra note 279 (the full name of the child
“Kaleb Drew” was allowed to be used in the media).
300
301
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have established policies that set forth a process by which students
may be accompanied by service dogs at school.305 If a school
district’s policy is not consistent with the ADA regulations and it
is not changed when problems are brought to its attention,
advocates should consider making a complaint to the Department
of Education’s Office for Civil Rights or Department of Justice,
Civil Rights Division before considering litigation.306
School districts should be proactive in putting policies in place
that ensure that they are complying with the revised ADA
regulations and carefully consider the federal agencies’
interpretations of the extent to which service animals must be
accommodated. It can be costly, from both a time and financial
perspective, to deny a student utilizing a service animal access to
a school. There is no doubt that ensuring all students receive a
free appropriate public education is extremely challenging for
school districts. However, as a representative of the DOJ’s Civil
Rights Division stated in 2014: “[t]he Civil Rights Division will
vigorously enforce the ADA to ensure that students who use service
animals have a full and equal opportunity to participate in all
school activities with their peers.”307 Given the recent strong and
consistent positions by the DOE and DOJ supporting allowing
students to utilize service animals in schools, even in situations
where the student at issue may need assistance in handling the
service dog, school districts should evaluate whether it is more
effective to make the accommodation rather than engage in a
battle with a federal agency, in court and in the media.

305 E.g., Fairfax County Public Schools, supra note 249 (setting for the policy
regarding animals and service animals for Fairfax County Schools).
306 See generally U. S. Dep’t of Justice, Civil Rights Div., How to File an ADA
Complaint
with
the
U.S.
Department
of
Justice,
ADA.GOV,
http://www.ada.gov/filing_complaint.htm (last visited Feb. 6, 2016) (describing
procedure for complaints and subsequent department action); U.S. Department of
Education
OCR
Complaint
Process,
U.S.
DEP’T
OF
EDUC.,
http://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/complaintprocess.html (last visited Feb.
6, 2016) (providing information about the complaint process).
307 Press Realease, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Office of Pub. Affairs, New Jersey
School District to Adopt Service Animal Policies and Pay Fine to Resolve Justice
Department Investigation, (June 24, 2014), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/newjersey-school-district-adopt-service-animal-policies-and-pay-fine-resolve-justice
(quoting Acting Attorney General for the Civil Rights Division Jocelyn Samuels
in connection with the Delran Settlement Agreement discussed supra notes 190–
200 and accompanying text).

